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Brougham’s Ghost
MICHAEL ARIENS*
In defending Queen Caroline in the House of Lords, Henry Brougham
declared, “[a]n advocate, by the sacred duty of his connection with his
client, knows, in the discharge of that office, but one person in the world,
that client and none other.” Brougham’s ethic of advocacy has been cited
repeatedly as stating the American lawyer’s duty of zealous representation
of a client. It has often been called the “classic statement” of zealous representation and representing the “traditional view of the lawyer’s role.”
This essay challenges these conclusions. Brougham’s rhetoric was neither a classic statement of the duty of loyalty to a client, nor did it represent
a traditional view within the American legal profession. It was consciously
rejected in nearly all writings of American lawyers for most of American
history, and was not explicitly embraced until the 1970s. Reminding lawyers of the duty of zealous representation was promoted in the 1960s in part
to solidify the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Criminal Procedure revolution, for only zealous lawyers could protect the rights of the criminally accused. Brougham’s ethic of advocacy was used to provide a historical justification for a revived zeal in criminal defense practice, an effort to make
those lawyers more professional. This justification was transformed in the
1970s by two events: first, the American legal profession became enmeshed
in a professionalism crisis as a consequence of the Watergate affair. Second, that professionalism crisis was exacerbated by a fear of diminishing
economic prospects for American lawyers.
This essay is divided into three parts. First, it offers a full assessment
of Brougham’s representation of Queen Caroline. Second, it traces the published and negative reaction of American lawyers to Brougham’s statement
of the duty of zealous representation from the 1840s on. Third, the essay
explains why the consistent rejection of Brougham by American lawyers
became the “classic statement” of the duty of the advocate beginning in the
1970s.

*
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I. INTRODUCTION
“[A]n advocate, by the sacred duty of his connection with his client, knows, in the discharge of that
office, but one person in the world, that client and
none other. To save that client by all expedient
means—to protect that client at all hazards and
costs to all others, and among others to himself—is
the highest and most unquestioned of his duties.”1
1.
III PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES 114 (N. S. London, T. C. Hansard 1821) [hereinafter HANSARD’S PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES]. Hansard recorded Brougham’s speech in the
first person. Brougham’s statement is variously reported in other publications. The most
cited version of this speech is from Joseph Nightingale’s TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE, which
reads: “[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world,
and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, among them, to himself, is his first and only duty.” 2
THE TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (Joseph Nightingale ed., London, J. Robins & Co. 1821).
See also 2 THE TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 2-3 (Manchester, J. Gleave 1821). Both are written in the third person. It is slightly amended in Brougham’s 1839 OPINIONS, his 1841
SPEECHES and his posthumous 1871 autobiography, most importantly by capitalizing
“THAT CLIENT AND NONE OTHER.” HENRY BROUGHAM, 1 OPINIONS OF LORD
BROUGHAM, ON POLITICS, THEOLOGY, LAW, SCIENCE, EDUCATION, LITERATURE, &C. 143
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Henry Brougham’s 1820 defense of Queen Caroline in the House of
Lords has been cited repeatedly as historically explicating the American
lawyer’s duty of zealous representation of a client.2 Brougham’s formulation has been called “[t]he classic statement”3 of zealous representation, as
representing the “traditional view of the lawyer’s role,”4 and as encompassing the “basic narrative” of the American legal profession “for over two
centuries.”5
This essay challenges these conclusions.6 Brougham’s rhetoric did not
represent a traditional view of the American lawyer’s duty of zealous representation, nor did it frame the basic narrative of American lawyering.7 It
was consciously rejected in nearly all writings of American lawyers for
most of American history. Brougham’s ethic was not explicitly embraced
until the late 1960s and early 1970s. Brougham’s ethic of advocacy was
initially adopted as an important aspect of solidifying the Supreme Court’s

(Philadelphia, Lea & Blanchard Co. 1839); HENRY BROUGHAM, 1 SPEECHES OF HENRY LORD
BROUGHAM 63 (Philadelphia, Lea & Blanchard Co. 1841) [hereinafter BROUGHAM,
SPEECHES]; HENRY LORD BROUGHAM, 2 THE LIFE AND TIMES OF HENRY LORD BROUGHAM,
WRITTEN BY HIMSELF 308-09 n.* (New York, Harper & Brothers 1871).
2.
A HeinOnline search of “Brougham and Queen Caroline” in the database “Core
U.S. Journals” dated 1887-2013 results in 461 citations. A Westlaw Classic search of
“Brougham and Queen pre/2 Caroline” in the database “TP-ALL” results in nearly 300
citations, with the vast majority dated since 1980, given Westlaw’s limited historical inclusion of law reviews. Of course, some of these citations are critical.
3.
MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 9 (1975).
See also Abbe Smith & William Montross, The Calling of Criminal Defense, 50 MERCER L.
REV. 443, 446 n.20 (1999).
4.
Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1060 n.1 (1976).
5.
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1244
(1991).
6.
Thus, while I agree with Professor Michael Hoeflich’s conclusion that “the
nineteenth century view of legal ethics differed greatly from our own,” M. H. Hoeflich,
Legal Ethics in the Nineteenth Century: The “Other Tradition”, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 793,
794 (1999), I argue that this was not some “other tradition” of legal ethics.
7.
I conclude the excellent article, Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005), errs in declaring, “Within a
short time, Brougham’s declaration came to stand for the popular conception that an attorney
in this country must do everything legally permissible to promote his client’s interests and
objectives.” Id. I also conclude Monroe Freedman’s rejoinder to Zacharias and Green fails to
place Brougham’s representation of Caroline in its full context and fails to note the rejection
of Brougham in writings in Great Britain and the United States during the nineteenth century. See Monroe H. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham and Zeal, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1319
(2006). See also Monroe H. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham, Written by Himself, 19 GEO.
J. LEG. ETHICS 1231 (2006); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, “Anything Rather Than a
Deliberate and Well-Considered Opinion”—Henry Lord Brougham, Written by Himself, 19
GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 1221 (2006) (continuing debate on Brougham’s understanding of the
lawyer’s duty of zealous advocacy).
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Constitutional Criminal Procedure revolution of the 1960s.8 Zealous advocacy was urged in the criminal defense bar because much evidence existed
of its failures, and recurrent cries in support of zealous advocacy were made
in an effort to make more professional the defense of the criminally accused. In the 1970s, Brougham’s ethic was used to justify zealous advocacy
on a broader scale. This effort resulted from two events: first, the American
legal profession was enmeshed in an ideological crisis exacerbated by the
Watergate affair, one that led the American legal profession to defend zealous representation of a client on grounds of professionalism while condemning the actions of those lawyers who committed crimes on behalf of
the President. Second, the professionalism crisis was exacerbated by a fear
of diminishing economic prospects for American lawyers. This fear made it
more important for private practice lawyers to claim that the ideal of professionalism required protecting the interests of their paying clients, allowing those lawyers to align their ideological and material interests.
This essay is divided into three parts. First, it offers a full assessment
of Brougham’s representation of Queen Caroline. Second, it traces the consistently negative published reaction, beginning in the 1840s, of American
lawyers to Brougham’s declaration that the lawyer knew his client and no
other. Third, the essay explains why American lawyers in the late 1960s
and early 1970s began citing Brougham positively, and in support of the
claim that zealous representation of the client and no other was ethically
defensible.

II. HENRY BROUGHAM AND THE TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE
A.

THE TEMPESTUOUS MARRIAGE OF THE PRINCE AND
PRINCESS OF WALES

The 1795 marriage of Caroline and George, Prince of Wales (and future King George IV) was, by all accounts, unhappy.9 Their marriage was
arranged because the Prince of Wales was again an overextended debtor,
and marriage would likely lead Parliament to settle his debts and provide

8.
See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 379-444
(2000). See also WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 216-43
(2011).
9.
See generally FLORA FRASER, THE UNRULY QUEEN: THE LIFE OF QUEEN
CAROLINE (1996); CHRISTOPHER HIBBERT, GEORGE IV: THE REBEL WHO WOULD BE KING
201-03 (paper ed. 2007); JANE ROBINS, THE TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE: THE SCANDALOUS
AFFAIR THAT NEARLY ENDED A MONARCHY 18-23 (2006); ROGER FULFORD, THE TRIAL OF
QUEEN CAROLINE 18 (2001) (1968).
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him a larger annual allowance as a married man.10 His marital options were
relatively few, and with his father’s consent, he settled on his first cousin,
Princess Caroline of Brunswick (now part of Germany). Their first meeting,
just three days before they were wed, was a disaster. Both left this meeting
desperately unhappy with their betrothed.11 After the wedding, this state
continued. The Prince wrote that he and Caroline engaged in sexual intercourse during their marriage just three times, twice on their wedding night
and once the day after.12 Still, Caroline became pregnant, and gave birth to
a daughter, Charlotte, exactly nine months after the wedding day. A little
more than a year after their wedding, the Prince wrote to the Princess of
Wales: “[N]ature has not made us suitable to each other.”13 They soon led
separate lives.
In 1806, King George III agreed to open a secret inquiry known as the
Delicate Investigation, an investigation by four Cabinet ministers whether
Willy Austin, a young boy adopted by Caroline in 1802, was her biological
son.14 If so, he would take Charlotte’s place in the line of succession.15 The
second inquiry about which the Lords Commission heard evidence was
whether the Princess of Wales had engaged in other adulterous conduct.16
The former accusation was decisively refuted: “[T]here is no foundation
whatever for believing that the child now with the Princess is the child of
her Royal Highness.”17 But the Commission found some basis for the latter
accusation. It suggested that allegations of adultery “must be credited until
they shall receive some decisive contradiction.”18 If true, this was treason,
punishable by death. The Commission had not informed the Princess of the
investigation, of which she learned through other sources, and it gave her
no opportunity to rebut the charges, or to question her accusers. The Commission then left the matter for the King and the Cabinet. Eventually the
10.
See FRASER, supra note 9, at 43; FRANCES HAWES, HENRY BROUGHAM 116
(1957).
11.
See FULFORD, supra note 9, at 18; FRASER, supra note 9, at 53-54; HAWES,
supra note 10, at 119; HIBBERT, supra note 9, at 194.
12.
ROBINS, supra note 9, at 18 (quoting letter to Lord Malmesbury). Local gossip
was that they had sexual intercourse but once. See FULFORD, supra note 9, at 18.
13.
ROBINS, supra note 9, at 22; FRASER, supra note 9, at 83. This became known as
the “letter of licence,” for the entire sentence quoted above was, “Our inclinations are not in
our power, nor should either of us be held answerable to the other because nature has not
made us suitable to each other.” FRASER, supra note 9, at 83. Caroline may have (unwisely)
viewed the sentence as granting her some sexual license.
14.
See FRASER, supra note 9, at 155; ROBINS, supra note 9, at 29.
15.
See FRASER, supra note 9, at 152.
16.
Id. at 164.
17.
ROBINS, supra note 9, at 31; FRASER, supra note 9, at 171. Fraser concludes
Caroline engaged in adulterous affairs with several men during this time. See FRASER, supra
note 9, at 138-39, 146-65.
18.
FRASER, supra note 9, at 172.
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Prince and Princess received copies of the report, which the Princess vigorously attacked. At the end of the year, the full Cabinet largely washed its
hands of the mess: “[T]he facts of the case do not warrant their advising
that any further steps should be taken in the business by your Majesty’s
Government, or any proceedings instituted upon it.”19 The Prince was indignant.
In January 1813, Caroline wrote her husband, now the Prince Regent
after George III’s descent into mental illness, a letter protesting the Delicate
Investigation.20 She wrote at the behest of her new advisor, Henry Brougham, a lawyer and Whig Party politician who fervently opposed Prince
George.21 George did not respond, and in February the letter was leaked to a
sympathetic newspaper. The Prince Regent now publicly responded, as
Brougham predicted. George leaked statements made to the Delicate Investigation commissioners by those accusing Caroline of adultery.22 Newspapers chose sides, and those which championed Caroline saw their circulation rise substantially.
The next year Caroline voluntarily departed England for the European
continent. In the half-decade before the death of her uncle and father-inlaw, King George III, she spent most of her time in Italy, though she also
traveled. One member of her inner circle was Bartolomeo Pergami (also
known as Bergami), whom she met in Milan in 1814 and who originally
served as her courier. Pergami was quickly promoted and was handsomely
rewarded by Caroline.23 It appears he also became Caroline’s lover.24 The
Prince Regent employed spies to gain evidence of Caroline’s adultery,
which would allow him to obtain a divorce. Though the Cabinet refused to
initiate an investigation based on the hearsay evidence presented to it, in
1818 it permitted the Prince Regent to send his own Commissioners, known
as the Milan Commission, to investigate Caroline’s conduct.25
Late that year, the Milan Commission took depositions of persons who
may have possessed evidence of Caroline’s adultery, but who also had a
great interest in the scandal. A total of eighty-two witnesses gave testimony, “and more were instantly sent back home as being of bad character.”26
19.
Id. at 185.
20.
See ROBINS, supra note 9, at 40-41.
21.
See id. at 37-40; HAWES, supra note 10, at 123, 130. Caroline and Brougham
met in 1809. See ROBERT STEWART, HENRY BROUGHAM, 1776-1868: HIS PUBLIC CAREER 140
(1986).
22.
ROBINS, supra note 9, at 42.
23.
See FRASER, supra note 9, at 256.
24.
See ROBINS, supra note 9, at 67 (quoting letters from 1815 that convinced
Brougham and others “Caroline and Pergami were enjoying an active sex life”); FRASER,
supra note 9, at 266 (noting suspicions in late 1814).
25.
FRASER, supra note 9, at 303-04.
26.
Id. at 311.
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One star witness was Louise Demont, who had served as Princess Caroline’s lady’s maid from 1814 until her dismissal in 1817 for conspiring to
steal from the Princess. The commissioners spent twenty-two days deposing
her, “to allow her time for recollection and not to fatigue her by too long
attendance at one sitting[.]”27 Caroline was well aware of the actions of the
Commission, and began a counteroffensive in March 1819.
Caroline was visited then by James Brougham, Henry’s brother. James
wrote Henry that he believed Caroline was engaged in an adulterous relationship with Pergami.28 Caroline suggested to James a willingness to agree
to a divorce if she was well settled financially, but Henry Brougham rejected the idea on the ground that only an admission of adultery would permit a
divorce.29 Henry Brougham then appeared to broker an agreement in mid1819 with the government, in which Caroline would agree to a formal separation, renounce her claim to be crowned as Queen, and receive her allowance for life.30
Brougham told Caroline nothing about the proposed settlement.31
Brougham’s inexcusable inaction may have been a consequence of his wish
to serve himself by serving “the Regent secretly,”32 or because he “liked to
be in a strong bargaining position with the government, and adored being at
the centre of the political stage.”33 He “was beginning to play his client
false.”34 An early Brougham biographer concluded, “The tortuousness of
his conduct gave rise to what was probably a well-founded suspicion in the
minds both of friends and foes, that he was willing to betray the cause of
the injured Princess for his own personal advancement.”35
From mid-1819 through late spring 1820, Brougham was intent on
serving only his own interests. Brougham attempted to curry favor with the
Prince Regent, writing Baron John Hutchinson, who was friendly with
both,36 that he wished the Prince Regent to know “that I [represent Caroline] involuntarily and after having done all I could to avoid it, and that
whatever consequences follow are imputable to others and not to myself.”37
He went further. Brougham sought the high honor of appointment as King’s
27.
Id. at 300, 316; ROBINS, supra note 9, at 79.
28.
FRASER, supra note 9, at 319; ROBINS, supra note 9, at 79.
29.
ROBINS, supra note 9, at 79-80; FRASER, supra note 9, at 320-25.
30.
ROBINS, supra note 9, at 80; FRASER, supra note 9, at 324-25.
31.
ROBINS, supra note 9, at 81; FRASER, supra note 9, at 325.
32.
FRASER, supra note 9, at 325.
33.
ROBINS, supra note 9, at 81. See also HAWES, supra note 10, at 148-49.
34.
STEWART, supra note 21, at 145.
35.
ARTHUR ASPINALL, LORD BROUGHAM AND THE WHIG PARTY 103 (1927). See
also STEWART, supra note 21, at 146 (suggesting Brougham was either willing to abandon
Caroline to benefit himself or was acting in a role of patriot hoping to avoid a crisis).
36.
AUSTIN MITCHELL, THE WHIGS IN OPPOSITION, 1815-1830 at 145 (1967).
37.
FRASER, supra note 9, at 353.
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Counsel, which, “giving him precedence at the Bar, would ensure his permanent success as a circuit lawyer, and would add many thousands to his
yearly income.”38 Upon receiving his silk gown as King’s Counsel, he
would have renounced Caroline as a client.39 This effort failed, but not for
Brougham’s lack of trying.40 Shortly before the 1820 trial of Caroline,
Brougham wittily and wickedly undermined her in polite society. He was
heard to say at a dinner party that Caroline was “pure in-no-sense.”41
The Milan Commission presented the government its findings declaring Caroline an adulterer in July 1819, evidence which the Cabinet found
insufficient, in part because it came from “foreigners, most of them not
above the rank of menial servants.”42
Both the government and Caroline waited for the next move of the
other. Caroline traveled briefly to Lyon, France to await a visit from
Brougham, which never occurred as a result of political events in England.
Then, on January 29, 1820, King George III died, making her husband King
and herself Queen. This forced events to a head.
In February 1820, Caroline appointed Brougham her Attorney General, though for good reason she little trusted him.43 In mid-April, Brougham formally presented the government with his warrant as Caroline’s counsel. Brougham’s double-dealing continued, as he played both sides on
whether, and if so, when, Caroline would return to England.44 Ignoring
Brougham, she landed in Dover on June 5.
The next day, Brougham, who “seemed to have gambled with every
party and interest, and lost,” defended Caroline in the House of Commons,
38.
ASPINALL, supra note 35, at 106.
39.
Id. at 107 (quoting letter from Lord Canning to Prime Minister Lord Liverpool);
see also STEWART, supra note 21, at 147 (stating Brougham “now let Canning know that the
award of a silk gown might induce him to take the government’s part”).
40.
See FRASER, supra note 9, at 352. Fraser calls Brougham’s conduct “traitorous.”
Brougham’s offer failed in large part because Lord Eldon, the Lord Chancellor who controlled such appointments, hated Brougham and refused to offer him the silk gown given all
King’s Counsel. Id. Brougham biographer Frances Hawes is less condemnatory than Fraser,
rejecting the conclusion that Brougham “sold the Queen.” But she accepts the view that
Brougham “would have abandoned her had he by so doing been able to bring the Whigs into
office.” HAWES, supra note 10, at 146.
41.
See FRASER, supra note 9, at 406; HIBBERT, supra note 9, at 561.
42.
ROBINS, supra note 9, at 81; see also FRASER, supra note 9, at 325. Brougham
made xenophobia a part of his defense, accusing Italians of being experts in perjury, ROBINS,
supra note 9, at 248-49, and his colleague Thomas Denman argued that an oath by a Roman
Catholic was not binding unless “taken within a certain time after confession and after receiving the sacrament.” Id. at 200. Denman was overruled, but his objection offered a reminder that most of the witnesses against the Queen were considered untrustworthy because
they were Catholic.
43.
ROBINS, supra note 9, at 109-10; FRASER, supra note 9, at 342; ASPINALL, supra
note 35, at 110.
44.
See FRASER, supra note 9, at 356-60, 363.
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“probably [because it was] now in his best interests to exert himself to the
utmost on behalf of his client.”45 Caroline, with knowledge of some but not
all of Brougham’s perfidy, kept him as her Attorney General.
B.

THE TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE

On June 7, the House of Lords appointed a secret committee to assess
the evidence from both the Delicate Investigation and the Milan Commission.46 In the House of Commons, Brougham gave a strong, theatrical
speech defending Caroline and attacking those who attempted to stain her
honor.
Threatened by the King, the government decided in early July to pursue a Bill of Pains and Penalties. This was a rarely used procedure that substituted for an uncertain impeachment or criminal case.47 The purpose of the
bill was declared in its opening: “[A]n Act to deprive her Majesty Caroline
Amelia Elizabeth of the Title, Prerogatives, Rights, Privileges and Exemptions of the Queen Consort of this Realm, and to dissolve the Marriage between his Majesty and the said Caroline Amelia Elizabeth.”48 A Bill of
Pains and Penalties became law only if adopted by a majority in both the
House of Lords and the House of Commons. A majority was specifically
required to accept the allegation that Caroline had engaged in “licentious,
disgraceful and adulterous intercourse” with Pergami.49 Proof of that allegation required witnesses, which meant an adversarial proceeding in which
counsel gave speeches and examined witnesses, making consideration of
the Bill akin to a trial.50
In addition to allowing divorce without any threat of a charge of treason (and thus, the death penalty), the Bill also possessed another aspect
appealing to the King. Evidence that the King had engaged in adulterous
behavior, known as recrimination evidence, was no longer relevant.51 Divorce was rare, but was certainly unavailable to either party if both engaged

45.
Id. at 371.
46.
See id. at 379.
47.
See id. at 399-400. One great difficulty with charging the Queen with treason
was that she was accused of adultery with Pergami, an Italian. The Queen engaged in treason
only indirectly, through the act of the man with whom she engaged in sexual intercourse.
Because Pergami was Italian, it was not treason for him to have sexual relations with the
wife of the heir to the British throne. And if Pergami’s actions were not treasonous, neither
were Caroline’s. See id. at 340, 378-79.
48.
FRASER, supra note 9, at 400; ROBINS, supra note 9, at 142.
49.
FRASER, supra note 9, at 400; ROBINS, supra note 9, at 143.
50.
FRASER, supra note 9, at 401; ROBINS, supra note 9, at 143. The witnesses
against the Queen were unknown to her counsel before they were called.
51.
See FRASER, supra note 9, at 399.
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in adultery.52 Eliminating any public references to the King’s numerous
mistresses over the years was important to the government. And it was crucial that the trial eliminate any references to the King’s 1785 “marriage” to
a twice-widowed Roman Catholic, Mrs. Maria Fitzherbert.53
As a young man, the Prince of Wales fell in love with the widowed
Mrs. Fitzherbert. On December 15, 1785, she and the Prince were married
by an Anglican priest in the presence of her brother and uncle. For several
years, they traveled together and attended the same public events, though
they formally lived in separate houses.54 And though he eventually grew
tired of her, shortly after Caroline gave birth to their daughter Charlotte in
1796, he wrote a will leaving “All my worldly property of every description
to my Maria Fitzherbert,”55 “my wife, the wife of my heart and soul.”56
It was politically irrelevant that the marriage with Mrs. Fitzherbert was
unlawful under the Royal Marriages Act of 1772. The Prince’s actions were
evidence of his recklessness (marrying a Roman Catholic would exclude
him from serving as King under the 1689 Bill of Rights and the 1700 Act of
Settlement).57 This was also evidence of his insensitivity to the general public, which remained quite prejudiced against Catholics, who suffered many
civil disabilities.58
The “marriage” between George and Mrs. Fitzherbert was much speculated upon. A cartoon drawn by James Gillray was published in 1786, and
titled The Morning After Marriage. It depicted what appeared to be the
Prince of Wales and Mrs. Fitzherbert leaving a bed.59 Other social elites
gossiped about the marriage. On August 17, 1820, when the first speeches
regarding the Bill of Pains and Penalties were made in the House of Lords,
Gillray’s Morning After cartoon was republished.60
Brougham’s opening speech to the House of Lords on August 17,
made the first of his two statements on the extent of the duty of the advocate: “[A]n advocate knows but one duty, and, cost what it may, he must
discharge it. Be the consequences what they may, to any other persons,
powers, principalities, dominions or nations, an advocate is bound to do his
duty” to his client.61 This was an implicit threat by Brougham to disclose
52.
See ROBINS, supra note 9, at 143 (quoting The Times (London)). This was also
the rule in the United States in 1820.
53.
See FRASER, supra note 9, at 35-36.
54.
See id. at 34-36.
55.
See id. at 75.
56.
ROBINS, supra note 9, at 20.
57.
See FRASER, supra note 9, at 34.
58.
This largely ended with the adoption by Parliament of the Catholic Relief Act,
1829, 10 Geo. 4 c. 7.
59.
FRASER, supra note 9, at 36; ROBINS, supra note 9, at 14.
60.
See FRASER, supra note 9, at 409.
61.
STEWART, supra note 21, at 154. See also FRASER, supra note 9, at 420.
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publicly the King’s unlawful marriage to Mrs. Fitzherbert. Brougham also
threatened to bring forward other recrimination evidence, even as he disclaimed any intention of doing so: “I put out of view at present the question
of recrimination” at Caroline’s request.62 But Brougham also indicated that,
if necessary, “I should act directly in the teeth of the instructions of this
illustrious woman. I should disobey her solemn commands if I again used
even the word recrimination without being driven to it by an absolute and
overruling compulsion.”63
Over the next three weeks, the government offered evidence from a
number of witnesses who provided circumstantial evidence of adultery between Caroline and Pergami. This evidence was brought into question by
scorching cross-examinations by Brougham and other barristers representing Caroline.64 The defense was granted a three-week continuance, and the
case re-opened on October 3.
Brougham’s famous statement of the duty of the advocate, to which he
had already adverted in his August 17 speech, was given at the beginning of
his two-day speech proclaiming Caroline’s innocence. He again informed
the Lords that evidence of recrimination was unneeded due to the paucity of
evidence against Caroline. However, “but for this conviction, my lips
would not at this time be closed.”65 With that implied threat, Brougham
then expanded on his August 17 speech on the duties of an advocate to his
client, as published in Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates:
And let it not be thought, my lords, that if either
now I did conceive, or if hereafter I should so far
be disappointed in my estimate of the failure of the
Case against me, as to feel it necessary to exercise
that right—let no man vainly suppose, that not only
I, but that any, the youngest member of the profession would hesitate one moment in the fearless discharge of that duty. I once before took leave to remind your lordships—which was unnecessary, but
there are many whom it may be needful to remind—that an advocate, by the sacred duty of his
connection with his client, knows, in the discharge
62.
ROBINS, supra note 9, at 172. Acting in such a way today would, of course,
violate Rule 1.2 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
63.
Id. at 172-73.
64.
See id. at 197-200; FRASER, supra note 9, at 424-25 (noting the crossexamination by Brougham of government witness Teodoro Majocchi, during which Majocchi repeatedly stated, “Non mi ricordo,” “I don’t remember,” which was used to show Majocchi’s selective memory regarding Caroline’s adultery with Pergami).
65.
2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE, supra note 1, at 8.

274

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

of that office, but one person in the world, that client and none other. To save that client by all expedient means—to protect that client at all hazards
and costs to all others, and among others to himself—is the highest and most unquestioned of his
duties; and he must not regard the alarm, the suffering, the torment, the destruction, which he may
bring upon any other; nay, separating even the duties of a patriot from those of an advocate, he must
go on reckless of the consequences, if his fate it
should unhappily be, to involve his country in confusion for his client.66
Though a majority of the House of Lords adopted the Bill, it did so by
a very slight margin. It then voted to postpone consideration of the Bill for
six months, effectively killing it.67 Within nine months, the Queen was
dead.68

66.
HANSARD’S PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, supra note 1, at 114. The language
differed slightly in each published report. The New York Evening-Post printed this portion of
Brougham’s speech as:
And let it be remembered, that if hereafter I should find the
case I rely upon fail me, I shall not scruple to avail myself of
the means which at present I decline using: and let no man
think, under such circumstances, that I, or the youngest member of the profession to which I belong, would hesitate to resort to enter upon the discharge of the painful duty. I have
stated on a former occasion, but to your Lordships it was unnecessary, that an advocate, in the discharge of his duty,
knows but one person in all the world—his client, and no other. To save that client by all expedient means, is his duty: and
that all risks, inconveniences, and costs to other persons, and
to himself among them; and he is not to regard the alarm, the
tortures or the destruction which the discharge of his office
may bring down upon others, but he must boldly go on, reckless of consequences, even though it should be his unhappy
fate to throw his country into confusion for a season.
N.Y. EVENING-POST, Oct. 31, 1820, at 1 (copy on file with author). This was found at the
New York Public Library on microfilm. The most commonly cited edition of the trial, Joseph Nightingale’s TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE (1821), is written in the third person, and also
slightly differs from either of these two reports. See 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE, supra note
1, at 8. The report from The Times (London), differs slightly from this quoted version, and is
also written in the third person. See The Times (London), Oct. 4, 1820, at 1 (copy on file
with author).
67.
FRASER, supra note 9, at 443; ROBINS, supra note 9, at 285-87. As occasionally
happens in a conventional trial, whether the Queen had committed adultery, the only issue
formally relevant to the Lords, faded as some Lords (and the public, through the papers)
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The “one direct consequence” of Brougham’s representation of Caroline was his improved economic standing at the bar.69 Though he hadn’t
obtained his silk gown, his law practice “increased fivefold,” and his income rose accordingly.70 He also became a favorite of trial spectators, who
arrived early to ensure a courtroom seat to listen to him.
Brougham lived a long and influential life, outliving by decades not
only Queen Caroline, but also George IV.71 He slightly edited and published his October 3 speech (and not its predecessor from August 17) in
several books. In the 1841 American edition (from the 1838 British publication) of his Speeches it read:
And let it not be thought, my lords, that if either
now I did conceive, or if hereafter I should so far
be disappointed in my expectation that the case
against me will fail, as to feel it necessary to exercise that right—let no man vainly suppose, that not
only I, but that any, the youngest member of the
profession would hesitate one moment in the fearless discharge of his paramount duty. I once before
took leave to remind your lordships—which was
unnecessary, but there are many whom it may be
needful to remind—that an advocate, by the sacred
duty which he owes his client, knows, in the discharge of that office, but one person in the world,
THAT CLIENT AND NONE OTHER. To save that client
by all expedient means—to protect that client at all
hazards and costs to all others, and among others to
himself—is the highest and most unquestioned of
his duties; and he must not regard the alarm—the
suffering—the torment—the destruction—which
he may bring upon any other. Nay, separating even
the duties of a patriot from those of an advocate,
and casting them, if need be, to the wind, he must
go on reckless of the consequences, if his fate it

reacted in disgust at the government’s behavior in obtaining its evidence. Other members of
the public were angry because they rejected the British form of constitutional monarchy.
68.
FRASER, supra note 9, at 461; ROBINS, supra note 9, at 313.
69.
STEWART, supra note 21, at 160.
70.
Id. (indicating Brougham’s annual income was “probably in excess of £8,000, a
handsome sum for those days”).
71.
He was 89 when he died in Cannes, France, on May 7, 1868. See HAWES, supra
note 10, at 296.
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should unhappily be, to involve his country in confusion for his client’s protection!72
This 1838 version of Brougham’s October 3, 1820 speech offers a
more heroic tone than the original. Brougham speaks of the “fearless discharge of his paramount duty” rather than “the fearless discharge of that
duty,” and he uses small capitalization to emphasize the advocate’s duty to
“THAT CLIENT AND NONE OTHER.”73 He also ends by noting that his country’s “confusion” is a consequence of ensuring his “client’s protection.”
This tone may have further burnished Brougham’s reputation. But it failed
to convince lawyers in Great Britain or the United States that the advocate
knew “THAT CLIENT AND NONE OTHER.”

III. REJECTING BROUGHAM
A.

THE INITIAL RESPONSE IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE
UNITED STATES, 1820-1840

References in British and American publications to Brougham’s ethic
of advocacy in Queen Caroline’s case were relatively few from 1820
through 1840.74 This was so even though in Great Britain, and to a lesser
but significant extent in the United States, the issue of the lawyer’s duty of
loyalty to a client was the subject of much comment.75
In England, the issue of lawyer conduct was intimately tied to the issue
of legal representation of felony defendants.76 For historical reasons, Englishmen charged with misdemeanors or with treason were given full legal
representation by 1800. But persons charged in 1800 with a felony, usually
punishable by death, were allowed to use a barrister to (1) argue questions
of law, and (2) examine and cross-examine witnesses. The barrister was not
72.
BROUGHAM, SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 63.
73.
Brougham’s 1838 revision also suggested a greater loyalty to his client than the
version printed in HANSARD’S PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, for in the former the advocate now
“owes” a sacred duty to his client, and must even cast the duties of the patriot “to the wind”
to meet the needs of his client.
74.
See DAVID J.A. CAIRNS, ADVOCACY AND THE MAKING OF THE ADVERSARIAL
CRIMINAL TRIAL 1800-1865 at 137 (1998) (noting little in British publications). See also
ALLYSON N. MAY, THE BAR AND THE OLD BAILEY, 1750-1850 at 204 (2003) (noting
“Brougham’s words, in particular the doctrine of all expedient means, were immediately
controversial and would subsequently attract sustained criticism.”). I checked Niles’ Weekly
Register and the North American Review and existing American legal publications. Although
Brougham was often mentioned, none of those American publications discussed his ethic of
advocacy, and I have not found any other such reference.
75.
See The Legal Profession in England, 42 N. AM. REV. 513 (1836).
76.
This paragraph is largely taken from CAIRNS, supra note 74, at 25-55.
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allowed to speak directly to the jury. That task was undertaken by the prisoner, who gave an unsworn statement to the jury. This changed only upon
the adoption in 1836 by Parliament of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act.77 The
debate on full representation began shortly after the cessation of the Trial of
Queen Caroline, and concerned the role defense counsel would play in a
trial. Would the barrister for the prisoner aid or detract from the search for
the truth at trial if allowed to speak to the jury instead of the prisoner? Both
sides of this debate agreed that the trial would become more adversarial if
full representation was allowed. But they disagreed on the relation between
full representation and the truth-seeking goal of the criminal trial. Although
reformers eventually prevailed, the issue of the bounds of lawyerly zeal was
widely discussed during and after this debate.78
The 1838 British publication of Brougham’s Speeches, which included
the amended version of his 1820 speech in the House of Lords on the duty
of the advocate, reminded other lawyers of Brougham’s view of the advocate’s duty.79 In the late 1830s the Englishman and Tory (Conservative)
politician Benjamin Disraeli was sued for libel by Charles Austin, a lawyer.
In court, Austin accused Disraeli of bribery.80 Disraeli responded in a letter
published in a newspaper, rejecting the privilege from libel charges lawyers
received for statements made in court. This legal privilege allowed lawyers
to “circulat[e] falsehoods,” and was wrongly justified as “doing your duty
towards your client.”81 While defending himself in the libel suit, Disraeli
retracted his statement but again criticized the “licence” granted counsel,
and quoted the amended version of Lord Brougham’s defense of Queen
Caroline.82
American newspapers avidly and fully followed the 1820 trial of Caroline, even with a three- to four-week delay in receiving the news from England. The New York Daily Advertiser reported news on the case several
times in August, and began publishing stories about the trial nearly daily
(the paper was ordinarily published Monday through Friday) from late September through the middle of October. The New York Evening-Post was
even more fixated on the trial, publishing daily some report from the middle
of August through October. The Queen’s August 1820 Letter from the
77.
The Prisoners’ Counsel Act is reprinted in pertinent part in CAIRNS, supra note
74, at 181-83. On the transformation of the criminal trial before adoption of the Prisoners’
Counsel Act, see generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL
(2003).
78.
For a discussion of this dispute, see MAY, supra note 74, at 183-94.
79.
Id. at 137.
80.
Id. at 127. This is also recounted in Lord Beaconsfield and the Bar, 17 GREEN
BAG 90 (1905).
81.
CAIRNS, supra note 74, at 127.
82.
See The Practice of Advocacy, 17 LEG. OBSERVER, OR J. JURIS. 130, 131 (1838).
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Queen to the King was also published in the United States.83 The interest in
the trial may be shown in the manner of the coverage both papers gave the
trial. As the trial continued, both papers, published as four-page broadsheets, gave over more and more coverage to it. And though both papers
almost universally printed only advertisements on page one and left news
information to page two, on several occasions the front page consisted of
news of the trial. Most importantly, both papers printed Brougham’s October 3 speech in defense of Queen Caroline on page one.84 The coverage
differed, and only the Evening-Post included Brougham’s statement that the
advocate “knows but one person in the world—his client, and no other.”85
Despite the extensive coverage of the trial of Queen Caroline, no particular
attention was paid to the issue that entranced future lawyers, the extent of
the lawyer’s duty of loyalty in zealously representing a client.
One possible exception was a brief reference to Brougham’s early July
speech on his duty to his client, in the August 26, 1820 issue of Niles’
Weekly Register.86 Hezekiah Niles,87 using “extracts from London papers of
the 9th of July,”88 discussed the issue of a lack of notice of the witnesses
who would testify against Caroline. After Brougham was allowed to speak,
he was “checked” by the Lord Chancellor. He responded: “‘[N]o power
under Heaven should prevent him from attempting to do his duty to his
illustrious client, but he might be put down—there was no resisting power—yet he knew their lordships were wont to be just.’”89 Niles revisited the
case in several subsequent issues, most notably in the November 4, 1820
issue, which specifically discussed Brougham’s defense of Queen Caroline.90 Niles described the powerful impact of Brougham’s defense of
Queen Caroline. Quoting the London Courier (a paper supporting King
George IV), Niles reported that Brougham said “‘that it might be his unhappy lot, in the discharge of his duty, to make charges of a nature as serious as it is possible for any individual to stand impeached with,’” though
the specifics of such charges would be held for later.91 This is the closest
83.
Letter from the Queen to the King, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Sept. 27, 1820, at 2
(copy on file with author). William Cobbett, an English pamphleteer and former American
resident, claimed a half million copies of the Letter were published in the United States. See
ROBINS, supra note 9, at 164.
84.
See The Trial of the Queen, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Oct. 31, 1820, at 1; N.Y.
EVENING-POST, Oct. 31, 1820, at 1 (copies on file with author).
85.
N.Y. EVENING-POST, Oct. 31, 1820, at 1.
86.
NILES’ WKLY. REG., Aug. 26, 1820, at 461.
87.
See Broadus Mitchell, Niles, Hezekiah, in 8 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN
BIOGRAPHY 521 (Dumas Malone ed., 1933).
88.
NILES’ WKLY. REG., Aug. 26, 1820, at 449.
89.
Id. at 461.
90.
NILES’ WKLY. REG., Nov. 4, 1820, at 145, 148.
91.
Id. at 148.
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Niles’ Weekly Register comes to quoting Brougham’s “an advocate knows
but one person in the world” language.
None of the several British publications of The Trial of Queen Caroline were re-published in the United States until 1874.92 But Americans
enjoyed delayed access to the London newspapers awash in coverage of the
trial, as well as access to a number of British magazines, including the Edinburgh Review, which Brougham co-founded and for which he wrote
many reviews and articles.93 The general tenor of the American news articles regarding the trial concerned the myriad political consequences of the
trial, including the possibility of “riot, INSURRECTION, REVOLUTION,”94
and not the detail of an advocate’s duty to his client.
One relatively full American assessment of Brougham’s representation
of Caroline was offered in the July 1831 issue of the North American Review.95 By this time Brougham was known in the United States at least as
much for his 1828 speech urging law reform96 as for his representation of
Caroline. The article presents an invigorating defense of Caroline and of
Brougham’s advocacy. It commends Brougham for the exercise of “the
most untiring zeal,”97 and notes Brougham’s opening speech in Caroline’s
defense. But it never speaks of Brougham’s expansive definition of zeal,
mentioning only that Brougham “entreated [the House of Lords] to save the
country and themselves.”98
American law publications between 1820 and 1840 were few.99 None
published anything that spoke of Brougham’s 1820 speech, and only one
92.
See THE TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE (New York, James Cockroft & Co. 1874).
By 1835, the Library Company of Philadelphia possessed a copy of THE LEGISLATORIAL
TRIAL OF HER MAJESTY (1820), but neither Harvard University nor the Library of Congress
owned a copy then. Thanks to Brian Detweiler for this information.
93.
TROWBRIDGE H. FORD, HENRY BROUGHAM AND HIS WORLD: A BIOGRAPHY 28
(1995).
94.
NILES’ WKLY. REG., Nov. 4, 1820, at 145.
95.
Life and Character of Henry Brougham, 33 N. AM. REV. 227 (1831) [hereinafter
Henry Brougham].
96.
See Brougham’s Speech, 1 AM. JUR. & LAW MAG. 310 (1829); DAVID PAUL
BROWN, REVIEW OF THE SPEECH OF HENRY BROUGHAM, ESQUIRE, UPON THE STATE OF THE
LAW (Philadelphia, Mifflin and Parry 1828).
97.
Henry Brougham, supra note 95, at 246.
98.
Id.
99.
See FREDERICK C. HICKS, MATERIALS AND METHODS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 204
(3d ed. 1942) (listing publications). The Philadelphia-based Journal of Jurisprudence published one volume in 1821 focused largely on Pennsylvania cases. The Annual Law Register
of the United States collected and published state laws for one year, 1822, and then ceased.
The New York-based United States Law Journal and Civilian’s Magazine was also first
published in 1822. A second volume under new editorship was published in 1826. Its articles
were narrowly focused on commercial law. The United States Law Intelligencer and Review,
published in Philadelphia beginning in 1829 and ending in 1831, offered nothing of rele-
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article discussed the ethics of the “good advocate.” It concluded, “The good
advocate is one who will not plead the cause wherein his tongue must be
confuted by his conscience.”100 Neither the 1836 second edition of David
Hoffman’s A Course of Legal Study101 nor Timothy Walker’s 1837 Introduction to American Law,102 both of which offered American lawyers and
law students the first maxims of legal ethics, mentioned Brougham. And
although Hoffman’s Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment
urged lawyers to represent clients with “honourable zeal,”103 Hoffman implicitly rejected Brougham’s ethic, favoring instead an ethic of lawyer honor.104
B.

A “MONSTROUS DOCTRINE,” 1840-1860

The paucity of references to Brougham’s ethic of advocacy before
1841 was followed by a significant number during the remaining antebellum years. Brougham’s Opinions of Lord Brougham was published in the
United States in 1839, and his Speeches in late 1841.105 Further, the
Courvoisier controversy of 1840 in London intensified the discussion of the
ethics of advocacy in Great Britain and later in the United States.
During his trial for murder, Benjamin Courvoisier confessed his guilt
to Charles Phillips, his barrister. Courvoisier also refused to plead guilty
and demanded Phillips continue to represent him. Phillips acquiesced after
conferring with Baron Parke, who assisted the trial judge but who otherwise
did not preside.106 After Courvoisier was found guilty and sentenced to
death, he publicly confessed, and announced that Phillips knew of his guilt

vance. Finally, the American Jurist and Law Magazine, published in Boston, published its
first issue in 1829, and went out of business in 1843. Id. at 204.
100.
The Good Advocate, 1 J.L. 58, 58 (1830). This quote is likely taken from an
English work, THOMAS FULLER, THE HOLY STATE (1642), quoted in MAY, supra note 74, at
206, though the Journal of Law does not reference Fuller’s work. Brougham is unmentioned
in this article.
101.
2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 744 (Baltimore, Joseph Neal,
2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter LEGAL STUDY]. See also DAVID HOFFMAN, HINTS ON THE
PROFESSIONAL DEPORTMENT OF LAWYERS (Philadelphia, Thomas Cowperthwait & Co.,
1846) (compiling previous material on legal ethics and ignoring Brougham).
102.
TIMOTHY WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN LAW (Philadelphia, P.H. Nicklin & T. Johnson, 1837).
103.
LEGAL STUDY, supra note 101, at 754.
104.
See Michael Ariens, Lost and Found: David Hoffman and the History of American Legal Ethics, 67 ARK. L. REV. 571 (2014).
105.
BROUGHAM, SPEECHES, supra note 1. The American printing of Brougham’s
SPEECHES was announced in the November 1841 issue of the Boston-based Monthly Law
Reporter. See 4 MONTHLY L. RPTR. 288 (1841).
106.
MAY, supra note 74, at 214.
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and continued to defend him.107 Courvoisier revived the issue of the permissible breadth of criminal defense advocacy in Great Britain, and drew
attention there to Brougham’s speech on the ethic of advocacy.108 Phillips’s
duty in representing Courvoisier was also discussed in American publications.109
In 1843, the Pennsylvania Law Journal became the first American
magazine to publish an article evaluating and criticizing Brougham’s definition of the ethics of the advocate.110 It reprinted in part an anonymous
review in the Dublin University Magazine of an English book titled The
Lawyer, his Character, and the Rule of Holy Life, re-published in the United States by a Philadelphia publisher.111 The review began, “The great principle of Mr. O’Brien’s book is the obligation of governing legal practice by
strict reference to the supreme Law of Conscience, in despite of the evil
prescription that so strongly countenances oblique and dishonest courses.”112 The review called Brougham’s defense of Caroline the “popular theory”113 of the relation of lawyer and client in Great Britain, but a theory
which “only evinces how easily a principle of false honour may assume the
dignity of self-sacrificing virtue.”114 It noted two justifications were made
in support of Brougham’s maxim: one, the “representational” or “agency”
model of the lawyer-client relationship, and two, the utilitarian view that
obliging barristers to take all cases secured “the greatest amount of justice
in the country.”115 The first justification had been made anonymously by
Brougham in the Edinburgh Review in late 1836.116 This justification
claimed an advocate stood in the place of the client and did not “appear at

107.
See DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 126 (1973).
108.
See id. at 131-40. These events are also discussed in CAIRNS, supra note 74, at
140-42, and MAY, supra note 74, at 214-21. See also Michael Ariens, American Legal Ethics
in an Age of Anxiety, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 343, 375-76 (2008) (noting Courvoisier case and
controversy in England and the United States about the ethics of defending the confessedly
guilty client).
109.
See The Practice of the Bar, 9 MONTHLY L. REP. 241, 242-54 (1846) (reprinting
article from the London Law Magazine defending lawyers in the “late controversy in England between the Bar and the Press”).
110.
The Lawyer, His Character, &c., 2 PENN. L.J. 185 (1843).
111.
EDWARD O’BRIEN, THE LAWYER, HIS CHARACTER, AND THE RULE OF HOLY LIFE:
AFTER THE MANNER OF GEORGE HERBERT’S COUNTRY PARSON (Philadelphia, Carey & Hart,
1843).
112.
The Lawyer, His Character, &c., supra note 110, at 185.
113.
Id. at 186. Cairns disagrees, noting that “the predominant view was that there
were moral qualifications on counsel’s duty to his client.” CAIRNS, supra note 74, at 126.
114.
The Lawyer, His Character, &c., supra note 110, at 187.
115.
Id. at 188.
116.
CAIRNS, supra note 74, at 141-42 (citing [Henry Brougham], Rights and Duties
of Advocates, 64 EDINBURGH REV. 155 (1836) [hereinafter Rights and Duties of Advocates]).
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all in his own person.”117 Thus, the advocate was literally the mouthpiece of
the client, who at that time was incompetent to testify.118 The anonymous
reviewer considered the agency theory wrong on the instrumental ground
that it is the lawyer who “is himself the framer of the whole case.”119 The
utilitarian argument was rejected by refusing to concede either the general
claim that zealous advocacy led to the greatest amount of justice in society
or its application in specific cases.120 The reviewer perceptively suggested a
qualified adoption of Brougham: not “for the purpose of opposing or denying the higher principles of duty—but salutarily to qualify the application of
them, by impressing upon the conscientious advocate the danger of overstrained scrupulosity in the refusal of cliencies.”121 Brougham and others
argued for greater license in advocacy, in part, because they accepted the
premise that “an advocate was bound to accept all briefs, irrespective of his
opinions of the merits of the client’s case.”122 A barrister who not only rejected the duty to take on all briefs, but who refused a significant number
due to a too scrupulous conscience harmed the legal system. The barrister’s
duty to take any client’s brief was exacerbated by Parliament’s adoption in
1836 of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act, which allowed a felony defendant to
use legal counsel to address the jury, not merely to argue questions of law
or to examine witnesses.123
David Dudley Field124 was the first American lawyer to evaluate and
criticize Brougham’s ethic of advocacy.125 Field wrote insightfully about a

117.
Id. at 141 (citing Rights and Duties of Advocates, supra note 116, at 159).
118.
This was also the rule in the United States, until Maine allowed a criminal defendant to take an oath and testify in 1864. See George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as a Lie
Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 658, 662 (1997). See id. at 668 (listing in Table 1 of states
ending legal incompetence of criminal defendant in 1860s).
119.
The Lawyer, His Character, &c., supra note 110, at 189.
120.
Id. at 190-91.
121.
Id. at 187.
122.
CAIRNS, supra note 74, at 140 (citing justifications by Thomas Erskine and
Brougham). On this “cab rank” view, see id. at 140 n.38. American lawyers understood the
“cab rank rule” was inapplicable to them. See The Practice of the Bar, supra note 109, at
242 (“The English rule, that no barrister may decline a brief, under ordinary circumstances,
and must be on that side for which he is first retained, or not be in the case at all, we regard
as safer than our own practice, by which a counselor may select his own causes . . . .”).
123.
CAIRNS, supra note 74, at 3.
124.
On Field, see DAUN VAN EE, David DUDLEY FIELD AND THE RECONSTRUCTION
OF THE LAW (1986); HENRY FIELD, THE LIFE OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD (1898); Frederick C.
Hicks, Field, David Dudley, in 6 DICT. OF AM. BIOG. 360 (Allen Johnson & Dumas Malone,
eds., 1933); Stephen N. Subrin, Field, David Dudley, in YALE BIOG. DICT. OF AM. L. 193
(Roger K. Newman ed., 2009).
125.
See [David Dudley Field,] The Study and Practice of the Law, 14 U.S. MAG. &
DEM. REV. 345, 347 (1844) [hereinafter Field, Study]. This essay is reprinted in 1 SPEECHES,
ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 484 (A. P. Sprague ed.,
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changing legal profession in 1840s New York,126 and, though critical of
some of its failings, defended the position and role of the American lawyer
as an “index of civilisation.”127 But Field was confused about the origins of
Brougham’s argument on behalf of zealous advocacy:
Lord Brougham has even gone so far as to say, in a
speech in the English House of Lords, within a
year or two, that the advocate is bound to carry his
zeal for his client so far, as to forget that there is
any other person in the world beside him, and to
lose sight of every other consideration than the one
of his success.128
Field concluded, “Now to our view a more revolting doctrine scarcely
ever fell from any man’s lips. We think it unsound in theory and pernicious
in practice.”129 He later inaccurately quoted Brougham, “Forget that there is
any other person in the world than his client,” and derided this assertion as
a “monstrous declaration.” After Field noted that a lawyer owed duties to
“other parties” and to “society” “as well as to the one who has retained
him,” he concluded, “How can a man forget these, and retain his conscience or his memory?”130
Other antebellum law writers followed Field’s conclusion. New York
lawyer Richard Kimball, like Field, called Brougham’s ethic a “monstrous
doctrine.”131 In an address to the Philadelphia Law Academy, William Porter rejected Brougham and declared that a lawyer was not exempt from the
rule that “he who possesses power of any kind, holds it as a trustee for others.”132 A well-known Philadelphia lawyer, David Paul Brown, wrote a
New York, D. Appleton and Co., 1884), and in part as David Dudley Field, The Index of
Civilization, in THE GOLDEN AGE OF AMERICAN LAW 30 (Charles M. Haar ed., 1965).
126.
By the 1840s, the New York City bar was a diverse body, and just a year before
Field’s article the word “shyster” was first published as referring to a sly or conniving lawyer. See The Pettifogger, THE SUBTERRANEAN, July 22, 1843, at 12 (copy on file with author). See generally GERALD LEONARD COHEN, ORIGIN OF THE WORD “SHYSTER” (1982);
GERALD LEONARD COHEN, ORIGIN OF THE WORD “SHYSTER”: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
(1984). See also WILKES, THE MYSTERIES OF THE TOMBS (1844) (discussing awful lawyering
for New York City’s poor held in the Tombs on criminal charges) (copy on file with author).
127.
Field, Study, supra note 125, at 347.
128.
Id. at 347-48. Field likely confused the year of Brougham’s speech (1820) with
the 1841 American publication of Brougham’s SPEECHES.
129.
Id. at 348.
130.
Id. at 349.
131.
RICHARD B. KIMBALL, THE LAWYER: THE DIGNITY, DUTIES, AND
RESPONSIBILITIES OF HIS PROFESSION 26 (New York, George P. Putnam & Co., 1853).
132.
WILLIAM AUGUSTUS PORTER, THE INTRODUCTORY ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE
THE LAW ACADEMY OF PHILADELPHIA, AT THE OPENING OF THE SESSION OF 1849-50, ON THE
19TH SEPTEMBER, at 19 (Philadelphia, Edmond Barrington & Geo. D. Haswell, 1849). See
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two-volume memoir of his life and career published in 1856.133 Brown rejected Brougham’s ethic of advocacy: it “can certainly never be approved
by any just or reasonable man.”134 Without citing Brougham, Chief Justice
Edward Bannister Gibson of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court wrote, “It is a
popular, but gross mistake, to suppose that a lawyer owes no fidelity to any
one except his client; and that the latter is the keeper of his professional
conscience.”135
Just two somewhat favorable references are made regarding Brougham’s ethic of advocacy from 1841-1861. In the July, 1847 issue of the
Pennsylvania Law Journal, the anonymous author, in discussing the propriety of a lawyer serving as a witness, stated Brougham’s position, “however
open to animadversion as a social principle, is, and will continue to be, the
motive power by which most trials are conducted. In the heat of the contest
other considerations recede.”136 Soon thereafter a judge in the Lancaster
(Pa.) County Court of Common Pleas discussed the same issue and cited
the quoted statement. But the court altered the original phrasing. It argued
that Brougham’s position, “although unsound in professional morality, is,
and will continue to be, in practice, the ruling principle by which trials will
generally be conducted.”137 The second statement offering some support for
Brougham’s ethic of advocacy was made in an 1860 tribute to the late Massachusetts lawyer Rufus Choate. Choate represented his clients zealously,
and “carried it practically as far as Lord Brougham, and carried it to the
extremest [sic] verge of honor; yet he was scrupulously careful not to do
any thing which would be false to his attorney’s oath, taken when he entered the bar, to be true to the court as well as the client.”138
also The Practice of the Bar, supra note 109, at 242 (noting that, unlike an English barrister,
an American “counsellor may select his own causes, . . . [which may put him] in danger of
becoming identified with his client, and of sharing his personal feelings”).
133.
DAVID PAUL BROWN, THE FORUM; OR, FORTY YEARS FULL PRACTICE AT THE
PHILADELPHIA BAR (Philadelphia, Robert H. Small 1856) [hereinafter BROWN, THE FORUM].
On Brown, see John Louis Haney, Brown, David Paul, 3 DICT. OF AM. BIOG. 111 (Allen
Johnson ed., 1929). See also Robert S. Bell, THE PHILADELPHIA LAWYER: A HISTORY, 17351945, at 114-15 (1992).
134.
BROWN, THE FORUM, supra note 133, at 28.
135.
Rush v. Cavenaugh, 2 Pa. (2 Barr) 187, 189 (1845).
136.
Lawyers No Witnesses in Their Own Cases, 6 PENN. L.J. 405, 408 (1847).
137.
Mishler & Hertzler v. Baumgardner (Pa. Ct. Com. Pleas 1847), 8 AM. L.J. 289,
307 (1849), 1 WEST. LEG. OBSERVER 33, 35 (1849).
138.
EDWARD G. PARKER, REMINISCENCES OF RUFUS CHOATE, THE GREAT AMERICAN
ADVOCATE 133 (New York, Mason Bros., 1860). A posthumous catalogue of Choate’s books
showed he possessed a copy of the 1838 English printing of Brougham’s SPEECHES. See
CATALOGUE OF THE LIBRARY OF THE LATE HON. RUFUS CHOATE 25 (Boston, Leonard & Co.,
1859). Wendell Phillips, a well-known Massachusetts lawyer and politician, spoke disparagingly of Choate’s ethics. He declared some of the people of Massachusetts allegedly said of
Choate, “This is Choate, who made it safe to murder, and of whose health thieves inquired
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That antebellum lawyers generally rejected the breadth of Brougham’s
ethic is found in the most popular book on lawyer ethics of the last half of
the nineteenth century, George Sharswood’s Compend of Lectures,139 first
published in 1854. Sharswood encouraged lawyers to represent clients with
“warm zeal,”140 and insisted that the lawyer was “not morally responsible
for the act of the party in maintaining an unjust cause.”141 But Sharswood’s
role morality did not extend as far as Brougham assayed. Sharswood excused Brougham in part due to the “excitement of so great an occasion,” but
declared Brougham’s declaration was a claim that, upon “cool reflection
and sober reason [a proposition one] certainly never can approve.”142
Sharswood noted that appearances might deceive, and, therefore, one
should rarely judge a lawyer’s conduct. He did allow that a lawyer’s zeal
extended its farthest in defending one accused of a crime. Because the defendant possessed a “constitutional right to a trial according to law,” and
“ought not to be convicted and undergo punishment unless upon legal evidence,” the lawyer should “suggest all those reasonable doubts which may
arise from the evidence as to his guilt, and to see that if he is convicted, it is
according to law.”143 The ensuing editions of Sharswood’s book, published
from 1860-1884, used the same language.144
C.

THE MODUS VIVENDI, 1870-1910

1.

New York, David Dudley Field and the Erie Wars

Sharswood’s conclusion concerning Brougham’s ethic of advocacy
remained a long-held commonplace view within the legal profession. What
changed in the American legal profession from 1870-1910 was not the rejection of Brougham’s ethics, but the belief that transformations of the practice of law made possible a practical adoption of Brougham’s ethic. This
before they began to steal.” Henry Wade Rogers, Legal Ethics, 16 YALE L.J. 225, 232 (1907)
(quoting Phillips).
139.
GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES OF
THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW (Philadelphia, T. & J. W. Johnson, 1854). The book originated
from his lectures to University of Pennsylvania law students in 1850. The second edition
was published in 1860 under the title An Essay on Professional Ethics. The fifth edition was
published posthumously in 1884. Sharswood changed little from the first through the fifth
edition.
140.
Id. at 24.
141.
Id. at 26.
142.
Id. at 29.
143.
Id. at 31.
144.
See GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 33-34 (Philadelphia, T. & J. W. Johnson, 2d ed. 1860). No substantive changes on the issue of the lawyer’s
duty of warm zeal were made in this or in the third, fourth or fifth editions.
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transformation of the legal profession made elite lawyers more insistent that
Brougham’s understanding of client loyalty was false, even as they feared
its unacknowledged acceptance.
In an otherwise forgotten 1869 speech to the graduating law class of
the University of Chicago, a lawyer named Thomas Hoyne emphatically
disagreed with Brougham’s statement of the lawyer’s duty: “Now I do not
believe in this doctrine of the client stepping in to usurp the place of conscience in the advocate, so as to render him utterly regardless of all his other obligations to truth, to justice, to right, and to others.”145 Hoyne linked
this standard of lawyer behavior to effectuating the rule of law. Though the
published record followed Hoyne’s conclusions, it appeared honored in the
breach as often as in the observance.
The most famous and trenchant example of this Brougham-like duty of
client loyalty was the legal representation, beginning in 1868, by David
Dudley Field and his partner Thomas Shearman, of Daniel Drew, Jay Gould
and “Diamond” Jim Fisk, who wanted to wrest control of the Erie Railway
from Cornelius Vanderbilt. The Erie “wars,” joined by elite lawyer revulsion toward New York City “Boss” William Tweed, whom Field also represented in the early 1870s, generated tremendous public outcry concerning
the low ethics of lawyers.146 In the North American Review, Charles Adams, great-grandson and grandson of the second and sixth Presidents, recounted the actions of Field and Shearman as beyond even Brougham’s
reckoning. After quoting Brougham, Adams wrote:
Certainly no counsel could have acted more fully
up to both the letter and spirit of this famous rule,
than did Messrs. David Dudley Field and Thomas
G. Shearman, of counsel for the Erie Railway
Company, on this notable occasion. They even
“cast to the wind” the single faint limitation conveyed by Lord Brougham in the words “to save”
and “to protect” by all “expedient means”; and, in
the intense fervor of their devotion to their clients,
had recourse in aggressive proceedings to process145.
1 CHI. LEG. NEWS 394, 395 (1869). See also President, Directors and Company
of the Third Western Turnpike Rd. Co. v. Loomis, 32 N.Y. (5 Tiffany) 127 (1865) (holding
Brougham’s statement an “atrocious but memorable declaration”); D. BETHUNE DUFFIELD,
THE LAWYER’S OATH: AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE CLASS OF 1867, OF THE LAW
DEPARTMENT, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, MARCH 27TH, 1867, at 9 (Ann Arbor, Dr. Chase’s
Steam Printing House, 1867) (rejecting Brougham).
146.
See generally JOHN STEELE GORDON, THE SCARLET WOMAN OF WALL STREET
(1988); GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS 3-8, 55-67 (1970). On Tweed, see generally KENNETH D. ACKERMAN, BOSS TWEED: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CORRUPT POL WHO
CONCEIVED THE SOUL OF MODERN NEW YORK (2005).
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es of law which were subsequently judicially characterized as procured “in aid of fraudulent purposes.” . . . The ingenious device, also, of arresting
one’s opposing counsel and holding him to
$25,000 bail, at the moment when his professional
services are likely to become peculiarly necessary,
is a feature in legal amenities with which the English barrister could not have been expected to be
familiar. A high authority has now, however, established these as part of the duties of the American
advocate. Instances of similar devotion will, therefore, unless the now obsolete practice of disbarring
should chance to be revived, probably hereafter become more common than they hitherto have
been.147
Field, whose 1844 essay rejected Brougham’s ethic as “monstrous,”
both defended his behavior and continued formally to reject Brougham. He
declared that though “[i]t is lawful to advocate what it is lawful to do, . . . I
do not assent to the theory of BROUGHAM that the lawyer should know nobody but his client.”148
This formal rejection of Brougham, combined with the implicit assertion that the lawyer possessed a duty to do all lawful things on behalf of a
client, became the standard approach to legal ethics for decades. William
Allen Butler’s February 1871 talk to a New York audience,149 published
later that year as Lawyer and Client: Their Relations, Rights, and Duties,
stated the view adopted by most elite lawyers of Brougham’s speech: “This
was a high and somewhat rapid flight of oratory, far beyond any justifiable
147.
Charles F. Adams, An Erie Raid, 112 N. AM. REV. 241, 284 (1871), reprinted in
CHARLES F. ADAMS, JR. & HENRY ADAMS, CHAPTERS OF ERIE, AND OTHER ESSAYS 182-83
(Boston, James R. Osgood & Co., 1871). A trenchant essay at that time criticizing both
Adams’s views and any lawyerly adoption of Brougham’s ethic is A Great Lawsuit and a
Field Fight, 13 THE GALAXY 376 (1872).
148.
DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, THE LAWYER AND HIS CLIENTS: THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES
OF LAWYERS, THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE PRESS, THE OPINIONS OF THE PUBLIC:
CORRESPONDENCE / BY DAVID DUDLEY AND DUDLEY FIELD, OF THE NEW YORK BAR, WITH
SAMUEL BOWLES, OF THE SPRINGFIELD REPUBLICAN 9 (Springfield, (Mass.), Republican
Office, 1871) (reprinting Jan. 5, 1871 letter of David Dudley Field to Samuel Bowles). Dean
Theodore Dwight of the Columbia College Law School condemned Brougham’s “sentiments
in strong language” in his commencement speech in 1870, and obliquely referenced Field’s
behavior in the Erie cases. See Columbia College Law School, 1 Alb. L.J. 419, 419 (1870).
149.
See Local Miscellany, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Feb. 4, 1871, at 8 (noting delivery of
third in series of lectures by Butler on “relations arising between lawyer and client” and
adopting view that lawyer does not know the cause is bad until decided by a judge, but rejecting Brougham’s approach).
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limit of duty or privilege. . . . It is rarely quoted, except to be condemned.”150 Other postbellum writers echoed Butler. Henry Sedgwick
urged lawyers to “[f]orget the fallacious eloquence of Brougham.”151 Dorman B. Eaton stated, in referring to Brougham, “No language can too
strongly reprobate so detestable and barbarous a code of professional ethics,
more becoming a band of pirates or brigands than a Christian officer of
justice.”152 And Theodore Bacon summarized in 1883 the consensus view:
“I do not deem it important here to controvert the extraordinary proposition
enunciated by Lord Brougham upon the trial of Queen Caroline . . . . [I]t
has seldom since been approvingly cited, unless by some advocate maintaining an unconscionable cause by reprehensible methods.”153 The condemnation of Brougham, in fact, appeared more and more often in published talks and legal treatises from the 1880s and 1890s.154
One lawyer who championed Brougham’s ethic was A. Oakey Hall, a
former District Attorney and Mayor of New York implicated in the Tammany Hall scandals of the early 1870s.155 In a series of reminiscences for
the lawyer magazine The Green Bag in the 1890s, Hall regularly praised
150.
WILLIAM ALLEN BUTLER, LAWYER AND CLIENT: THEIR RELATION, RIGHTS, AND
DUTIES 41-42 (New York, D. Appleton and Co., 1871).
151.
HENRY D. SEDGWICK, THE RELATION AND DUTY OF THE LAWYER TO THE STATE,
LECTURE BEFORE THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
FEBRUARY 9TH, 1872, at 16 (New York, Baker & Godwin, 1872).
152.
DORMAN B. EATON, THE PUBLIC RELATIONS AND DUTIES OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION: AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE ALUMNI AND GRADUATING CLASSES OF
THE YALE LAW SCHOOL, AT ITS FIFTY-EIGHTH ANNIVERSARY, JUNE 27TH, 1882, at 22-23
(New Haven, Hodgson & Robinson, 1882).
153.
Theodore Bacon, Professional Ethics, 17 J. SOC. SCI. 37, 41 (1883).
154.
See EDWARD M. PAXSON, THE ROAD TO SUCCESS, OR PRACTICAL HINTS TO THE
JUNIOR BAR: AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE LAW ACADEMY OF PHILADELPHIA 9 (Philadelphia, Law Academy, 1888) (rejecting Brougham); RICHARD HARRIS, HINTS ON
ADVOCACY IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL COURTS 163 (3d Amer. ed. from 6th Eng. ed. William L.
Murfree, Sr., rev’r., St. Louis, William H. Stevenson, 1884) (“Lord Brougham’s authority,
however, on this point is very generally controverted.”); HENRY WADE ROGERS, ADDRESS TO
THE LAW CLASS OF MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY, JUNE 17, 1886, at 24 (n.p. 1886) (“I think that
both the judgment and the conscience of the profession reject the extreme opinion which was
expressed by Lord Brougham in Queen Caroline’s case.”); JOHN WESLEY DONOVAN,
MODERN JURY TRIALS AND ADVOCATES 181 (Albany, Banks and Brothers, 1881) (calling
Brougham’s ethic “offensive to good morals and especially degrading to advocacy”);
GEORGE F. HOAR, THE FUNCTION OF THE AMERICAN LAWYER IN THE FOUNDING OF STATES:
AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE GRADUATING CLASSES AT THE FIFTY-SEVENTH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE YALE LAW SCHOOL 21 (New Haven, Tuttle Morehouse & Taylor,
1881) (“But the moral sense of mankind has rejected Lord Brougham’s extravagant and
immoral statement of the duty of the advocate.”).
155.
See ACKERMAN, supra note 146, at 176-80. Hall was eventually acquitted at the
third trial, though his reputation was stained for years afterward. See id. at 284, 348-50. See
also Harry J. Carman, Hall, Abraham Oakey, in 8 DICT. OF AM. BIOG. 114 (Dumas Malone
ed., 1933).
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past trial lawyers for acting as “disciples” of Brougham.156 But in terms of
published voices, Hall was an outlier.

2.

A Professionalism Crisis, 1890-1910

The late nineteenth century consensus rejecting Brougham’s ethic of
advocacy arose at the same time as a “professionalism” crisis began etching
itself in the minds of the elite of the American legal profession. This crisis
consisted of several strands: a near doubling in the number of American
lawyers in the last two decades of the nineteenth century,157 and an even
steeper rise in its non-Protestant composition,158 a quest for celebrity (and
sometimes, notoriety) in the practice of criminal law,159 and a fear that the

156.
A. Oakey Hall, Ogden Hoffman, 5 GREEN BAG 297 (1893); A. Oakey Hall,
Cross-Examination as an Art, 5 GREEN BAG 423 (1893); A. Oakey Hall, John Van Buren, 7
GREEN BAG 209 (1895); A. Oakey Hall, Thomas Addis Emmet, 8 GREEN BAG 273 (1896).
See also A. Oakey Hall, Daniel Dougherty and the Philadelphia Bar, 9 GREEN BAG 141, 143
(1897) (noting Philadelphia bar rejected Brougham’s ethic and “has always equaled, if it did
not surpass, all other bars, in freedom from pettifoggers and from chicanery”).
157.
“Whether growing richer or poorer, there is one certain thing about the lawyers,
and that is the increase in their number is beyond all proportion to the increase in population.” 4 LAW NOTES 103 (1900); Winnow the Bar, 1 AM. LAW. 5 (Apr. 1893) (urging scrutiny of all claiming status of lawyer to eliminate “practitioners who most largely discredit the
profession”); JOHN DOS PASSOS, THE AMERICAN LAWYER—AS HE WAS—AS HE IS—AS HE
CAN BE 175 (1907) (“THE EXCESSIVE NUMBER OF LAWYERS, IS DETRIMENTAL,
BOTH TO THE COMMUNITY AND THE MORALE, OF THE PROFESSION.”). See also
JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE
WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 60 (2004) (noting census reports showing
rise in lawyers from 64,137 in 1880 to 114,460 in 1900) [hereinafter WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL
REPUBLIC]; ROBERT A. SILVERMAN, LAW AND URBAN GROWTH: CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE
BOSTON TRIAL COURTS, 1880-1900, at 75 (1981) (noting doubling of Boston lawyers between 1880-1900) [hereinafter SILVERMAN, LAW AND URBAN GROWTH]; Terence C. Halliday, Six Score Years and Ten: Demographic Transitions in the American Legal Profession,
1850-1980, 20 LAW AND SOC’Y REV. 53, 62 (1986) (listing census figures in Table 1). The
census number before 1910 included notaries and others who were not admitted to the bar.
Id. at 55 n.2.
158.
See WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC, supra note 157, at 60 (noting large increase in number of white lawyers of foreign-born parents between 1890 and 1910).
159.
See CAIT MURPHY, SCOUNDRELS IN LAW (2010) (discussing notorious turn of the
twentieth century criminal defense lawyers Howe and Hummel and their genius at selfpromotion); JOHN A. FARRELL, CLARENCE DARROW: ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED (2011);
HOWARD K. BERRY, HE MADE IT SAFE TO MURDER: THE LIFE OF MOMAN PRUIETT (Oklahoma Heritage Association, First Edition ed. 2001) (detailing notorious actions of Oklahoma
criminal defense lawyer of late nineteenth through first several decades of the twentieth
century); ADELA ROGERS ST. JOHNS, FINAL VERDICT (paper ed. 1962) (discussing life of her
father, Earl Rogers, a famous Los Angeles criminal defense lawyer from the late nineteenth
century); ALFRED COHN & JOE CHISHOLM, TAKE THE WITNESS (1934) (discussing the criminal defense work of Earl Rogers).
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absence of an enforceable standard of moral character160 invited a lowering
of ethical conduct of lawyers, allowing an influx of pettifoggers,161 criminal
law shysters162 and venal corporate lawyers.163 Some elite lawyers argued
the crisis was linked to the increase in contingent fee cases164 resulting from
a massive rise in personal injury cases.165
160.
See, e.g., The Profession’s Duty, 1 AM. LAW. 4 (May 1893) (“Among the regularly admitted and duly licensed practitioners, there is a considerable percentage who debase
their own faculties and degrade the profession by practices in every degree as reprehensible
any ever employed by unauthorized practitioners.”). The American Lawyer was published
monthly in New York beginning in 1893. Its intended audience was the business lawyer, and
it regularly ran editorials bemoaning moral failures within the profession.
161.
See T. Fletcher Dennis, The Lawyer from a Moral Standpoint, 5 AM. J. POL. 76,
77 (1894), reprinted in 50 ALB. L.J. 17 (1894) and 2 MINN. L.J. 179 (1894) (comparing
lawyers with pettifoggers, and declaring purpose of latter is to “defeat the ends of justice”).
This essay was also reprinted in part as Counsel and Client, 6 GREEN BAG 475 (1894).
162.
See Robert L. Harman, The Lawyer and the Shyster, 5 AM. LAW. 443 (1897); H.
M. Wiltse, Who is the Shyster?, 5 AM. LAW. 490 (1897); Isaac Miller Hamilton, Monstrosities of the Law, 2 AM. LAW. 294, 295 (1894). Members of the Alabama State Bar Association regularly inveighed against the rise of shysters in the state. See Report of the Comm. on
Leg. Educ. and Admission to the Bar, REPORT OF THE ORGANIZATION AND OF THE FIRST,
SECOND, AND THIRD ANNUAL MEETINGS OF THE AL. ST. B. ASS’N 250, 263 (Montgomery,
Ala., Smith & Armstrong, 1882); Address by Sterling B. Toney, PROC. 16TH ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE ALA. ST. B. ASS’N 76, 83 (Montgomery, Ala., Brown Printing Co., 1893);
Samuel M. Meek, The Power and Influence of the Bar, PROC. 18TH ANNUAL MEETING OF
THE ALA. ST. B. ASS’N ii, xxvii (Montgomery, Ala., Brown Printing Co., 1895); Report of
the Committee on Local Bar Associations, PROC. 22D ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ALA. ST. B.
ASS’N 104 (Montgomery, Ala., Brown Printing Co., 1899).
163.
See GILDED AGE LEGAL ETHICS: ESSAYS ON THOMAS GOODE JONES’ 1887 CODE
(Carol Rose Andrews et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter GILDED AGE LEGAL ETHICS]; Theodore
Roosevelt, Address at Harvard University (June 28, 1905), in 4 THEODORE ROOSEVELT,
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES AND STATE PAPERS 407, 419-20 (1910) (criticizing lawyers who
work to aid the wealthy to “override and circumvent the law”); The Opportunity in the Law,
39 AM. L. REV. 555, 555-63 (1905) (publishing May 4, 1905 speech by Louis D. Brandeis
criticizing materialism of lawyers).
164.
IRVING G. VANN, CONTINGENT FEES: AN ADDRESS IN THE HUBBARD COURSE ON
LEGAL ETHICS (1905); The Abuse of Personal Injury Litigation, 18 GREEN BAG 193, 202
(1906) (“The vast majority of these cases are prosecuted by plaintiffs suing as paupers, by
lawyers employed on a contingent fee basis. A worse combination to the end of securing
justice can hardly be imagined.”). But see Jeffries v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 110 U.S. 305
(1884) (holding contingent fee contract not champertous in state law claim); Taylor v. Bemiss, 110 U.S. 42 (1884) (holding contingent fee contract not champertous in federal claim);
GILDED AGE LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 163, at 58 (allowing use of contingent fee contracts
in 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics, though noting “they lead to many abuses, and certain
compensation is to be preferred”).
165.
See E. Parmalee Prentice, The Speculation in Damage Claims for Personal
Injury, 164 N. AM. REV. 199, 199 (1897) (noting large increase of personal injury claims
between 1875-1896 in Cook County (Chicago)); Edwin A. Parker, Anti-Railroad Personal
Injury Litigation in Texas, 19 PROC. TEX. B. ASS’N 165, 167-70 (1900) (noting rise in personal injury suits against railroads in Texas between 1881-1900 and extensive damage
awards); Randolph E. Bergstrom, COURTING DANGER: INJURY AND LAW IN NEW YORK CITY,
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The most trenchant complaint was disgust at lawyer behavior in the
courtroom between 1870 and 1910.166 During this time trial lawyers became
more technically proficient and inclined to use that proficiency as trials
became more clearly adversarial in nature. One prominent example is the
1881 trial of Charles Guiteau for the murder of President James Garfield.167
Guiteau shot Garfield at close range, and was immediately apprehended.
His lawyers defended Guiteau ably and fully on the ground of insanity. The
trial, including jury selection, took over two months, and the nearly 3,000
page transcript of the proceedings was peppered with legal and evidentiary
objections made by the government and the defense. Both parties made
tactical and strategic choices requiring the court to issue legal rulings (particularly concerning the many experts), and cross-examination was sharp
and extensive.168 By the end of the century, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court concluded some criminal defense attorneys took their technicallyimproved representation of the client too far. One writ of error was “a flagrant example of the perverted standard of professional ethics which assumes that counsel should help his client to escape the proper consequences
of his act by any move or device, short, perhaps, of actual fraud or imposition.”169
This was quite different from antebellum practice. As noted by one
elite lawyer writing in 1907, when the famous antebellum criminal defense
lawyer David Paul Brown of Philadelphia rose to address the jury
he carefully placed his gold snuff box in front of
him, took from his pocket a bandanna, silk handkerchief, blew his nose in the true spirit of a snuff
fiend, glanced slowly and carefully around the
court room, and after many minutes of clever preliminary acting, he bowed gravely to the Court, and
1870-1910 at 20 (1992) (Table 4) (noting rise in personal injury cases in New York City
from 12 to 595 between 1870-1910); Silverman, LAW AND URBAN GROWTH, supra note 157,
at 105 (noting number of streetcar personal injury lawsuits rose from about twelve to over
800 between 1880-1900). See generally WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC, supra note 157.
166.
DOS PASSOS, supra note 157, at 25 (“The Civil War marks the commencement
of an era of professional change—perhaps I am justified in saying, an intellectual decadence—in the Bar. There certainly was a transformation, from a profession to a business.”).
167.
See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES VS.
CHARLES J. GUITEAU (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1882).
168.
This is all the more remarkable because Guiteau’s principal lawyer was George
Scoville, a patent lawyer who “knew almost nothing about the criminal justice system.”
CANDICE MILLARD, DESTINY OF THE REPUBLIC: A TALE OF MADNESS, MEDICINE AND THE
MURDER OF A PRESIDENT 275 (paper ed. 2011).
169.
Commonwealth v. Hill, 39 A. 1055, 1055 (Pa. 1898). See also Commonwealth
v. Jongrass, 37 A. 207 (Pa. 1897). The errors alleged would commonly form an appeal today.
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began his classic, ornate, address to the “gentlemen
of the jury.”170
The tactics and strategems of late nineteenth century trial lawyers were
criticized on more technical grounds. One legal journal criticized the prosecutor in the 1893 murder trial of Lizzie Borden for failing to prepare professionally, by ignoring his duty “to learn from his witnesses before they
came into court the story they each would tell.”171 This was “professional
negligence.”172 In criminal trials of the 1890s, lawyers in different parts of
the nation were quite similar in approach, varying by degree rather than
kind in terms of evidentiary objections made and legal disputes argued. A
late 1897 Iowa murder trial demonstrates the extent to which defense lawyers believed an ethic of advocacy required nearly constant action: to prevent the state’s star witness from damning their client, the defendant’s lawyers “repeatedly objected during his testimony.”173 Their cross-examination
of that witness included attacks on his credibility (he was in line to receive
a reward for his actions), and even made legalistic arguments during crossexamination that barely related to the factual dispute (the witness tracked
the defendant from Iowa to the Klondike in Canada and arrested him, which
defense counsel argued was unlawful). Defense counsel ended its crossexamination one day with, “[W]e will see on Monday whether you are telling the truth.”174 The Iowa defense lawyers understood their role as creating
confusion, of “objecting to every single prosecution point, no matter how
small.”175 During the 1890s newspapers daily printed stories of murder and
murder trials, of which the most famous was the trial of Lizzie Borden.176
Those stories often detailed the tactical actions of lawyers, which those
lawyers could use to burnish their reputations and pocketbook.177
170.
DOS PASSOS, supra note 157, at 29.
171.
Professional Duty, 1 AM. LAW. 4 (July 1893).
172.
Id. at 5.
173.
PETER KAUFMAN, SKULL IN THE ASHES: MURDER, A GOLD RUSH MANHUNT, AND
THE BIRTH OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN AMERICA 145 (2013).
174.
Id. at 147.
175.
Id. at 150.
176.
EDMUND PEARSON, TRIAL OF LIZZIE BORDEN (Notable Trials Library Spec. ed.
1989) (1938).
177.
The number of recently published books discussing murder trials of the 1890s
suggests the plethora of material available to write such stories. See PAUL COLLINS, THE
MURDER OF THE CENTURY: THE GILDED AGE CRIME THAT SCANDALIZED A CITY & SPARKED
THE TABLOID WARS (2011) (noting 1897 murder in New York); HAROLD SCHECHTER, THE
DEVIL’S GENTLEMAN: PRIVILEGE, POISON, AND THE TRIAL THAT USHERED IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY (2007) (discussing 1898 murder in New York); ROBERT LOERZEL, ALCHEMY OF
BONES: CHICAGO’S LUETGERT MURDER OF 1897 (2004) (Chicago murder case); KAUFMAN,
supra note 173 (discussing 1897 Iowa murder). See also ELIZABETH DALE, THE CHICAGO
TRUNK MURDER: LAW AND JUSTICE AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY (2011) (discussing 1885
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Elite lawyers reacted in several ways. The Alabama State Bar Association drafted a Code of Ethics in 1887,178 which ten other voluntary state bar
associations largely adopted in the following two decades.179 The American
Bar Association began work on its Canons of Ethics in 1905,180 which it
adopted in 1908.181 Roscoe Pound, then an obscure academic, gave a famous speech at the 1906 Annual Meeting of the ABA attacking the view
that a lawsuit was akin to a game, which “leads counsel to forget that they
are officers of the court and to deal with the rules of law and procedure
exactly as the professional foot ball coach with the rules of the sport.”182
“The inquiry is not, What do substantive law and justice require: instead,
the inquiry is, Have the rules of the game been carried out strictly?”183 The
legal profession also engaged in more sustained efforts to disbar at least
some lawyers.184

murder case); TIMOTHY MESSER-KRUSE, THE TRIAL OF THE HAYMARKET ANARCHISTS:
TERRORISM AND JUSTICE IN THE GILDED AGE (2011) (discussing Chicago’s 1886 Haymarket
murder trial). An older iteration is NEWMAN LEVY, THE NAN PATTERSON CASE (1959) (discussing 1904 murder trial and re-trial in which author’s father successfully defended accused).
178.
See PROC. 10TH MEET. ALA. ST. B. ASS’N 10-21 (1888) (debating and adopting
Code of Ethics); CODE OF ETHICS, ADOPTED BY THE ALABAMA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,
DECEMBER 14, 1887, GILDED AGE LEGAL ETHICS, at 45-59; REP. COMM. ON CODE OF PROF.
ETHICS, 31 A.B.A. REP. 675, 685 (1907) (App. B) (reprinting Code of Ethics of Alabama
State Bar Association and other states).
179.
REP. COMM. ON CODE OF PROF. ETHICS, 31 A.B.A. REP. 675, 685 (1907) (App. B)
(reprinting Code of Ethics of Alabama State Bar Association and other states).
180.
See Henry St. George Tucker, Address of the President, 28 A.B.A. REP. 299,
383-88 (1905) (urging creation of a code of ethics); Transactions of the Twenty-eighth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 28 A.B.A. REP. 23, 132 (1905) (creating
committee to draft code of ethics).
181.
Transactions of the Thirty-first Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 33 A.B.A. REP. 3, 55, 86 (1908) (adopting the Canons of Ethics).
182.
Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration
of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395, 405 (1906).
183.
Id. at 406.
184.
A Westlaw search in the file “allstates” using a Boolean search of “disbar! &
attorney & da(bef 1910)” found the following number of disbarment cases (mostly appellate)
by decade:
1900-09 355
1890-99 208
1880-89 87
1870-79 48
Using the same file, a Boolean search of “roll w/5 attorney & stri! & da(bef 1910)” found
the following number of (mostly appellate) cases by decade.
1900-09 117
1890-99 74
1880-89 40
1870-79 66
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Lawyers continued publicly to reject Brougham’s ethic, while acknowledging the manifold faults of the profession. The American Lawyer,
“A Business Journal for Business Lawyers,” editorialized in 1893: “In their
advocacy of their clients [sic] claims, lawyers have neither moral nor legal
right to pervert testimony, distort or conceal facts, or seek to circumvent the
law.”185 Although a lawyer “may rightfully take measures, institute proceedings and introduce defenses that he as an individual would not . . . the
lawyer should never so absorb the man as to induce him to either seek legal
ends by illegal means or illegal ends by legal means.”186 The 1887 Alabama
Code of Ethics concluded that nothing had been worse for the profession
“than the false claim, often set up by the unscrupulous in defense of questionable transactions, that it is an attorney’s duty to do everything to succeed in his client’s cause.”187 In 1907, elite New York lawyer John Dos
Passos188 published The American Lawyer—As He Was—As He Is—As He
Can Be,189 which began with the confession that “when a lawyer undertakes
an honest introspection of his profession, he . . . must then say some ugly
things about himself.”190 Dos Passos did so, and then laid some of the
blame on Brougham’s ethic of advocacy. Dos Passos claimed Brougham’s
statements “have done incalculable harm and damage to youthful, designing, or resourceful lawyers.”191 They did such harm because too many lawyers had relied on Brougham’s assertions “over and over again . . . to cover
all kinds of dishonest practices and defenses.”192 Dos Passos concluded, “in
any rational view it was wholly, unmitigatedly, and disastrously bad.”193
In 1902, Thomas H. Hubbard gave $10,000 to endow a chair in legal
ethics at his alma mater, Albany Law School, and he was invited to give the
inaugural lecture. In discussing the relation of lawyer and client, Hubbard
favorably discussed Brougham’s ethic, noting that, though lawyers often
dissuade clients from making claims or defenses “that ought not to be
brought or interposed,” when the client so demanded, “it is the decision of
the client and not of the lawyer that finally prevails.”194 But Hubbard’s

185.
The Profession’s Duty, supra note 160, at 4.
186.
Id.
187.
GILDED AGE LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 163, at 50 (reprinting item 10 of Code).
188.
On Dos Passos, see H. W. Howard Knott, Dos Passos, John Randolph, 5 DICT.
OF AM. BIOG. 388 (Allen Johnson & Dumas Malone eds., 1933).
189.
DOS PASSOS, supra note 157.
190.
Id. at 4.
191.
Id. at 141.
192.
Id. at 142. Dos Passos also noted Brougham’s “public repudiation” of his statements in his 1859 letter to William Forsyth. See id.
193.
DOS PASSOS, supra note 157, at 143.
194.
THOMAS H. HUBBARD, Legal Ethics, in LEGAL ETHICS LECTURES DELIVERED
BEFORE THE STUDENTS OF LAW DEPARTMENT OF UNION UNIVERSITY 13, 19 (1903) [hereinaf-
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larger point was that this approach, adopted by “distinguished practitioners”
and accepted in practice, should be abolished:
The lawyer should be emancipated from servitude to his client in respect to the commencement
and conduct of suits.
The lawyer should control in determining what
cases may be brought before the court; what suits
may be begun, what defenses may be interposed. . .
. In all matters that involve conscience, whether
matters of form or substance, the lawyers’ decision
should be supreme from the beginning to the end
of litigation. The custom should be shattered, that
permits the lawyer to personate the client; to argue
against his own convictions; to substitute his client’s morals and conscience for his own in the
conduct of his cause.195
Hubbard and Dos Passos articulated a constant refrain of lawyers writing on ethics in the early twentieth century.196 Much was tied to this air of
crisis, a belief that an honorable profession was now in “ill repute.”197 The
profession’s poor reputation was a consequence of lawyers thinking only of
the needs of their clients, as suggested by Brougham. This thought process
ter HUBBARD, Legal Ethics]. On Hubbard, see Robert E. Riegel, Hubbard, Thomas Hamlin,
9 DICT. OF AM. BIOG. 332 (Dumas Malone ed., 1943).
195.
HUBBARD, Legal Ethics, supra note 194, at 23.
196.
See Henry Wade Rogers, Legal Ethics, 16 YALE L.J. 225, 235-36 (1907) (“I
have only to say that [Brougham’s ethic] has been properly denounced as ‘a degenerate
view’ of professional duty and honor.”); AARON V. S. COCHRANE, THE LAWYER AND HIS
CLIENT 12-13 (1908) (rejecting Brougham and calling it “drastic and extreme”); FRANK
IRVINE, ETHICS IN THE TRIAL COURT 5-6 (1913) (“Great mischief has been done by the frequent quotation of a passage in Lord Brougham’s speech in Queen Caroline’s Case.”);
HENRY M. BATES, THE DUTY OF LAWYERS WITH REFERENCE TO REFORM AND PROGRESS 1314 (1913) (noting Brougham’s statement “cannot have been meant literally, but it has been
made the prop of many a disingenuous apology for conduct clearly and radically unethical”);
Alfred J. Murphy, The Function of the Lawyer of Today, 21 LAW STUD. HELPER 5, 6 (1913)
(rejecting Brougham but noting approach “has not become wholly obsolete in practice”); T.
De Witt Talmage, A Sermon to Lawyers, 2 LAWY. SCRAP BOOK 301, 305 (1912) (arguing
“no right-minded lawyer could adopt sentiment”); George Gordon Battle, The Duty of Counsel in Defending Against a Criminal Charge, A Client Whom He Knows or has Reason to
Believe to be Guilty, 2 LAWY. SCRAP BOOK 177, 195 (1912) (“[T]he words used by Lord
Brougham are extreme and exaggerated . . . .”). See also Charles E. Wolverton, The Ethics of
Advocacy, 8 AM. LAW. 62, 64 (1900) (Brougham’s “words were uttered, however, as a menace, and not to indicate a rule of ethics; and it must be conceded that, under our modernized
institutions, the occasion for invoking such a principle can scarcely arise”).
197.
Homer Greene, Can Lawyers Be Honest?, 152 N. AM. REV. 194, 203 (1893).
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also allowed lawyers erroneously to accept the idea that law was merely a
trade or business.198 In response, elite lawyers increasingly insisted on declaring the duty of the lawyer to act not solely as an agent of the client, but
as an officer of the court.199 The criminal defense lawyer upheld the rule of
law by requiring the prosecution to offer evidence proving the defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.200 He did not do so by offering perjured
testimony, personal assurances of the defendant’s innocence, or, more
broadly, by focusing solely on the needs of one’s client. The inculcation of
professionalism (effectuating the rule of law, acting as an officer of the
court) was set in contrast to Brougham’s prescription to know only one’s
client.
Canon 15 of the ABA’s 1908 Canons of Ethics was titled, “How Far a
Lawyer May Go in Supporting a Client’s Cause.” It largely mimicked the
1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama State Bar Association, calling “false”
the belief that “it is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him
to succeed in winning his client’s cause.”201 The lawyer’s duty of client
loyalty was “to be performed within and not without the bounds of the
law.” A client was “entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and
defense . . . and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense.”202

198.
See, e.g., Robert Treat Platt, The Decadence of Law as a Profession and its
Growth as a Business, 12 YALE L.J. 441 (1903); George F. Shelton, Law as a Business, 10
YALE L.J. 275 (1901); Henry Laurens Clinton, 10 GREEN BAG 133, 137 (1898) (“Indeed the
defense of criminals in New York City is said by many in its Bar Institute to have ceased as
part of a profession and to have become a trade.”). See generally JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THE
LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? (1916).
199.
See COHEN, supra note 198, at 22 (“It is because of the lawyer’s position as an
officer of the Court that the disciplinary process is made practicable.”); ARTHUR H. DEAN,
WILLIAM NELSON CROMWELL 1854-1948: AN AMERICAN PIONEER IN CORPORATION,
COMPARATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 167 (1957) (claiming that William Cromwell, a
first-generation office lawyer, “never forgot that he was first and foremost an ‘officer of the
court’”); SAMUEL HABER, THE QUEST FOR AUTHORITY AND HONOR IN THE AMERICAN
PROFESSION, 1750-1900 at 208 (1991) (citing, among others, Thomas Cooley); Alfred
Hemenway, The American Lawyer, Address at the 1905 Annual Meeting of the American
Bar Association, in 28 A.B.A. REP. 390, 390 (1905) (“On admission to the Bar each [lawyer]
becomes an officer of the court.”).
200.
See Dennis, supra note 161, at 81; Louis J. Rosenberg, The Status of an Attorney Defending a Guilty Client, 10 YALE L.J. 24 (1900); GILDED AGE LEGAL ETHICS, supra
note 163, at 50-51 (reprinting Alabama Code item 13, which urged lawyers to defend criminally charged persons to effectuate the rule of law).
201.
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 15 (1908). Item 10 of the Code
of Ethics of the Alabama State Bar Association called “false” the claim “that it is an attorney’s duty to do everything to succeed in his client’s cause.” GILDED AGE LEGAL ETHICS,
supra note 163, at 50.
202.
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 15, supra note 201.
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The modus vivendi on the lawyer’s duty to a client was thus framed as
early as 1871, when David Dudley Field defended his conduct in the Erie
wars, and confirmed in the ABA’s 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics. A
lawyer possessed a duty to offer every legal claim or defense available to
the client, but the lawyer remained an officer of the court and thus was prohibited from straying beyond the law in representing a client. A lawyer
promoted the rule of law in using all lawful means when representing a
client, and therefore was not morally responsible for any lawful ends sought
by the client. The lawyer also obeyed his own conscience, and did not act as
his client’s mouthpiece. Finally, Brougham’s ethic of advocacy went beyond the bounds of ethical behavior.
D.

EXCEPTIONS TO PROVE THE RULE, 1920-1965

This implicit agreement within the legal profession may be why references to Brougham’s advocacy ethics were rare for the next four-plus decades.203 Most of these rare references repeated the timeworn conclusion. On
two important occasions, however, the standard view of Brougham’s ethics
was turned on its head. In the February 1927 issue of Harper’s Monthly
Magazine, lawyer Newman Levy called Brougham’s statement the “classic
statement of a lawyer’s duty to his client.”204 A generation later, Boston
lawyer Charles Curtis wrote an apparent full-throated defense of the identification of the private practice lawyer with the client, relying in part on
Brougham. In Curtis’s opinion, “Lord Brougham’s menace has become the
classic statement of the loyalty which a lawyer owes to his client, perhaps
because being a menace it is so extreme.”205
Neither Levy nor Curtis explained how Brougham’s statement of the
duty of the advocate had been transformed from a reviled assertion to the
203.
Francis Chapman, Lectures on Legal Ethics (III), 3 TEMP. L.Q. 409, 412 (1929)
(“[I]n no sound view of ethics have you any right to go to any such lengths”); George P.
Costigan, Jr., The Full Remarks on Advocacy of Lord Brougham and Lord Chief Justice
Cockburn at the Dinner to M. Berryer on November 8, 1864, 19 CAL. L. REV. 521 (1931)
(contextualizing Brougham); Recent Criminal Cases, 26 AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
276, 276 (1936); Philbrick McCoy, Some Professional Responsibilities of the Practicing
Lawyer, 25 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 463, 4750-76 (1953); LLOYD PAUL STRYKER, THE ART OF
ADVOCACY 276-77 (2007) (1954) (contextualizing Brougham); James A. Gardner, A ReEvaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege (Part I), 8 VILL. L. REV. 279, 334 (1963) (citing
Brougham’s statement and discussing relation to “lawyer’s identifying himself with the
client’s cause”).
204.
Newman Levy, Lawyers and Morals, HARPER’S MTHLY MAG., Feb. 1927, at
288, 292 [hereinafter Levy, Lawyers and Morals].
205.
Charles P. Curtis, Jr., The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 4 (1951). This
is repeated in CHARLES P. CURTIS, IT’S YOUR LAW 7 (1954). On Curtis, see Melvin I. Urofsky, Curtis, Charles Pelham, DICT. OF AM. BIOG. SUPP. SIX, at 142 (John A. Garraty ed.,
1980); Thomas A. Reed, Curtis, Charles Pelham, Jr., in YALE BIOG. DICT. OF AM. L. at 139.
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classic statement of the lawyer’s duty of zeal, and neither cited any source
for his conclusion. That may be because each quoted Brougham’s ethic of
advocacy in significant part to unsettle the pretensions of lawyers, to use
the extreme view of Brougham to call for a new or revived professionalism
among lawyers. Both Levy and Curtis were interested in making the legal
profession face the inevitable tension of the lawyer as Janus, one who owed
a duty of zealous representation to the client as well as a duty to society as
an officer of the court. Both offered the statement of Brougham to expose
the pretentiousness of high-minded lawyers who believed this tension applied only to down-market criminal defense lawyers, not elite law firm lawyers.
Levy was primarily a criminal defense lawyer and the son of Abraham
Levy, a well-known New York City criminal defense lawyer from the
1890s until his death in 1920.206 Levy’s attack is a paradigmatic example of
then-nascent legal realism, a plea to lawyers that is both cynical and romantic. Levy concluded the disjunction between “professional aspirations and
professional conduct” would remain “[u]ntil the bar is prepared to assume a
more realistic attitude toward its functions and its activities.”207 This realistic attitude was not found in the various codes of legal ethics, which emphasized “manners rather than morals,”208 and which gave the lawyer power to
invade the privacy of witnesses and to subject them to slanderous attacks.
Levy rejected the distinction between low status criminal defense lawyers
and high status business lawyers, concluding that both engaged in dilatory
tactical measures. He noted that only the latter, however, wished to continue to claim his (nearly all such lawyers were then male) virtue.209 This pretentiousness was all the more galling because the “guardians of the aristocratic traditions” desperately worked to “purge the bar of shysters,” never
acknowledging that they, too, were workers for hire.210 As the robber baron
Jay Gould reputedly said three decades earlier about all lawyers, “brains
were the cheapest meat in the market.”211

206.
On Newman Levy, see NEWMAN LEVY, MY DOUBLE LIFE: ADVENTURES IN LAW
LETTERS (1958) (self-styled memoir) [hereinafter LEVY, MY DOUBLE LIFE]; Newman
Levy is Dead at 77; Lawyer Noted for Light Verse, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1966, at 47. Levy
wrote a true crime story of a 1904 New York murder in which his father Abraham served as
defense counsel in the three trials. See LEVY, supra note 177. He discussed his father’s reputation in id. at 67-69 (noting lawyer and novelist Arthur Train “considered Abe Levy the
greatest criminal lawyer that this country had ever produced”) and in LEVY, MY DOUBLE
LIFE, at 14.
207.
Levy, Lawyers and Morals, supra note 204, at 289.
208.
Id.
209.
Id. at 293.
210.
Id.
211.
Shelton, supra note 198, at 276.
AND

2015]

BROUGHAM’S GHOST

299

Levy also wrote in the aftermath of the fall of William “Bill” Fallon, a
notorious criminal defense lawyer in New York City during the 1910s and
early 1920s. Fallon was known, in the subtitle of a book about him, as “the
famous criminal lawyer who defended over one hundred and twenty-five
homicide cases and never lost a trial!”212 Many of Fallon’s cases ended in
hung juries, and in 1923 Fallon was indicted in both state and federal court
with conspiring to obstruct justice by bribing a juror named Charles Rendigs, who had served as a juror in an earlier case in which Fallon had represented an accused.213 Fallon, who represented himself, was acquitted in
both cases and managed to avoid disbarment, but his career was finished.214
He was a paradigmatic example of the bombastic (and highly intelligent)
lawyer, one who saw no boundaries in representing his clients.
This was the context in which Levy quoted Brougham. Brougham’s
ethic of advocacy was the “classic statement” because it “has long been
accepted in practice if not in theory by a large part of the profession.”215 But
the romantic in Levy wanted to believe in something better: “[I]t is more
hopeful to believe that the legal profession still contains within itself the
essence of a higher morality and an enduring sense of public obligation.”216
Curtis wrote in 1951, as the American legal profession began to promote its importance to American society. Curtis, a Boston Brahmin, adopted the jurisprudential stream of the times, and did so in part to check a selfcongratulatory profession. Jurisprudentially, Curtis wanted lawyers to consider the importance of craftsmanship: “A lawyer may have to treat the
practice of law as if it were a game, but if he can rely on craftsmanship, it
may become an art, and ‘Art, being bartender, is never drunk; and Magic
that believes itself, must die.’”217 Craftsmanship in the practice of law was
one of the hallmarks of the legal process school of the post-World War II
era.218 Further, Curtis viewed the consummate private practice lawyer as a
Stoic, not a Christian.219 The practice of law was not an altruistic undertaking, and thus, not a Christian undertaking. Instead, “[t]he practice of law is
212.
GENE FOWLER, THE GREAT MOUTHPIECE: A LIFE STORY OF WILLIAM J. FALLON
(paper ed. 1962) (1931). The quote is found on the front cover of the 1962 paperback edition.
213.
Id. at 287-89, 293.
214.
Id. at 294, 327, 333. Fallon died in April, 1927, shortly after Levy’s article was
published. See id. at 340.
215.
Levy, Lawyers and Morals, supra note 204, at 292.
216.
Id. at 294.
217.
CURTIS, supra note 205, at 22 (quoting Peter Viereck, TERROR AND DECORUM
53 (1948)).
218.
See G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Evolution and
Social Change, in PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 136, 148 (1978). See generally
NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 205-99 (1995).
219.
CURTIS, supra note 205, at 19.
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vicarious,”220 and “detachment” from the client was essential.221 This detachment allowed the lawyer to develop a zest for the case, and “this zest
may deepen into a peculiar and almost spiritual satisfaction.”222 Only an
approach taken from the Stoics allowed the lawyer to “discharge his ‘entire
duty’ to his clients.”223 Curtis used Brougham to shock his readers, lawyers
and law students, out of their complacency, and to face the necessary extremism of the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to the client. Brougham’s ethic of
advocacy demonstrated how the lawyer played his role, and, “What really
and ultimately matters is that the game shall be played as it should be
played.”224
Curtis’s Stanford Law Review article was immediately denounced by
Henry Drinker, a Philadelphia lawyer and legal ethics writer.225 Drinker
concluded Curtis offered “many distorted and misleading statements as to
the lawyer’s duty to his clients, to the courts, and to the public.”226 The
famed criminal defense lawyer Lloyd Paul Stryker, writing in the aftermath
of Curtis’s arguments, contextualized Brougham’s statement, and revised
the duty of loyalty as “the duty of the advocate to say for his client all that
could have been honestly spoken by the client himself in his own behalf
had he been able.”227
The essays by Levy and Curtis were the only possibly dissonant
sounds in a world in which Brougham’s ethic of advocacy had been formally excised. By the mid-1960s, the American legal profession largely believed it had resolved the difficult issue of the lawyer’s competing duties of
zealousness demonstrating client loyalty and as an officer of the court.
Time had apparently sorted out this difficulty without any specific resolution needed from the institutions of the American legal profession. This
changed markedly beginning in the late 1960s.

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id.
Id. at 19-21.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 20.
CURTIS, supra note 205, at 21 (quoting GILBERT MURRAY, THE STOIC
PHILOSOPHY 50 (1915)).
225.
See Henry S. Drinker, Some Remarks on Mr. Curtis’ “The Ethics of Advocacy”,
4 STAN. L. REV. 349 (1952) [hereinafter Drinker, Some Remarks]. See generally HENRY S.
DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS (1953). On Drinker, see Sarah Barringer Gordon, Drinker, Henry
Sandwith, in YALE BIOG. DICT. OF AM. L. at 175.
226.
Drinker, Some Remarks, supra note 225, at 349.
227.
STRYKER, supra note 203, at 277.
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IV. REVIVING BROUGHAM, 1965-1983
A.

THE ABSENCE OF ZEAL AND THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE
LAWYER

The professed limitations on the conduct of the criminal defense lawyer through the 1950s are exemplified in the 1957 Code of Trial Conduct of
the American College of Trial Lawyers.228 The goal of the College of Trial
Lawyers was in “maintaining high standards of professional conduct and
deportment in the courtroom and hearing room.”229 The College praised its
own boldness, noting that “this is the first time any lawyer group has undertaken to promulgate a code of standards of ethics, deportment and conduct
for the trial lawyer.”230 But the standards promoted by the College reflected
a complacent profession, one largely ignoring the tension found in serving
two masters, the client and the court.
The College’s discussion of the duties of the criminal defense lawyer
reflected this complacency, ignoring the thoughtful critiques and questions
offered by Levy and Curtis. Rule three, titled Employment in Criminal Cases, began with the rule of law argument made a century earlier, that every
person accused of a crime, no matter how infamous, had a right to a fair
trial, and that a lawyer’s repugnance to the accused or the crime was insufficient to decline to take the case.231 Rule four required the lawyer to “raise
all valid defenses.”232 But if the defendant made a “confidential disclosure
of facts clearly and credibly showing guilt, the lawyer should not present
any evidence inconsistent with those facts.”233
Thus, the criminal defense lawyer, even without a confession, was to
judge the credibility of the client’s confidential disclosure to determine if
that statement clearly showed guilt. If the statement did so, the lawyer was
to temper the defense of the accused. George Sharswood’s 1854 Compend
228.
A Code of Trial Conduct: Promulgated by the College of Trial Lawyers, 43
A.B.A. J. 223 (1957) [hereinafter Code of Trial Conduct]. The College was created in 1950
and was limited to a select few highly successful lawyers. See MARION A. ELLIS & HOWARD
E. COVINGTON, JR., SAGES OF THEIR CRAFT: THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS OF THE AMERICAN
COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS (2000).
229.
Code of Trial Conduct, supra note 228, at 223.
230.
Id.
231.
Id. at 224. Because of the Cold War and fears of a taint of Communism, lawyers
in the 1950s worried about the ability of those accused of crimes linked to their Communist
beliefs to obtain defense counsel. See Proceedings of the 1953 Annual Meeting of the House
of Delegates, 94 A.B.A. REP. 118, 133 (1953) (adopting resolution of Special Committee on
Individual Rights as Affected by National Security reaffirming the duty of the bar to represent even the most unpopular defendants).
232.
Code of Trial Conduct, supra note 228, at 224.
233.
Id.
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of Lectures concluded that the “lawyer, who refuses his professional assistance because in his judgment the case is unjust and indefensible, usurps the
function of both judge and jury.”234 Even when the client confidentially
confessed he was guilty of the crime charged, Sharswood declared the lawyer for the accused was bound to use “ALL FAIR ARGUMENTS ARISING ON
235
THE EVIDENCE.”
The clearest statement concerning the lawyer’s duty to
the client was found in the preamble to the Code. It phrased the lawyer’s
duty as one of “undivided allegiance,” using “all honest and appropriate
means within the law to protect and enforce legitimate interests.”236 Not
only did the College avoid using the word “zeal,” it set strict parameters on
that undivided allegiance to remind its readers that no Brougham-like efforts would be countenanced.
Others bemoaned the state of criminal justice, including criminal defense practice. A Massachusetts trial judge asked, in 1953, “[W]hy do those
who have started practice within the last two score years, or perhaps a little
earlier, regard practice of the criminal law as unworthy of their time and
minds?”237 That same year, the President of the American Bar Association
concluded, “[T]he bar has never given sufficient attention to the problem of
criminal justice in America,”238 in significant part “because most of our
lawyers practice civil law exclusively.”239 Edward Levi of the University of
Chicago Law School noted in a 1952 talk that the workings of criminal law
“have been insulated away from a large part of the bar.”240 A criminologist
writing in the mid-1950s evinced some surprise that “[m]ost of the convictions (93.8 percent) were not convictions in a combative, trial-by-jury
sense, but merely involved sentencing after a plea of guilty had been entered.”241 He added, “[O]n the eventual disposition of the cases, e.g.,
whether sent to prison or placed on probation,” it did not matter whether the
defendant was represented by an attorney.242
The lack of zeal in criminal defense work during this time may be
demonstrated in two cases that held defendants received ineffective assis234.
SHARSWOOD, supra note 139, at 31. See also id. at 31 (requiring criminal defense lawyer to “suggest all those reasonable doubts which may arise from the evidence as to
his guilt, and to see that if he is convicted, it is according to law”).
235.
Id. at 44.
236.
Code of Trial Conduct, supra note 228, at 224.
237.
Daniel T. O’Connell, Problems Confronting Trial Courts, 37 J. AM. JUD. SOC’Y
71, 73 (1953).
238.
Robert G. Storey, The Legal Profession and Criminal Justice, 36 J. AM. JUD.
SOC’Y 166, 166 (1953).
239.
Id.
240.
See EDWARD H. LEVI, FOUR TALKS ON LEGAL EDUCATION 31-32 (1952).
241.
Donald J. Newman, Pleading Guilty for Consideration: A Study of Bargain
Justice, 46 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 780, 781 (1956).
242.
Id. at 782.
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tance of counsel, exceptions that proved the rule. In the 1957 case of Lunce
v. Overlade,243 two defendants were provided a court-appointed attorney
before their trial for robbery in Indiana. Their attorney “advised them that if
they pleaded guilty he could probably get” them a sentence of less than
life.244 The defendants told him (the attorney is not named in the court’s
opinion) they were innocent. He told them that “unless they pleaded guilty
there was nothing he could or would do for them,” and also told them that
despite his duty to represent them, “he had no intention of pursuing their
interests any further.”245 When the trial was called, the attorney was absent,
and never appeared. The trial court insisted on proceeding, and an Ohio
attorney (also not named in the opinion) representing a third defendant who
successfully moved for dismissal of the charges, agreed to represent the two
remaining defendants without charge. The Seventh Circuit noted, “counsel,
who was not admitted to practice before the courts of Indiana and who was
apparently wholly unversed in Indiana law and practice, proceeded, without
any preparation, to conduct petitioners’ defense.”246
As one would expect, this ended badly. Both defendants were convicted, and this same counsel “attempted to prosecute an appeal, but because of
his ignorance of Indiana appellate procedure he failed to perfect the appeal
and finally gave up.”247 The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions.248 In collateral proceedings petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus,
the Seventh Circuit issued the writ and reversed the convictions. It held,
“The record made by Ohio counsel in his defense of petitioners irrefutably
demonstrates that he was so ignorant of Indiana law and procedure that it
was virtually impossible for him to protect or even to assert petitioners’
rights.”249
A federal district court, in a second case two years later, found the lack
of zeal by defense counsel in a state murder case so astonishing that it too
issued a writ of habeas corpus in collateral proceedings. It held that defense
counsel was ineffective after admitting “that his conscience would not permit him to adopt certain customary trial procedures.”250 More remarkable
was the conclusion of a 1960 annotation on the subject of incompetency of
counsel: Lunce was
unusual in that it is one of a very limited group of
cases which, in addition to recognizing that the
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957).
Id. at 109.
Id.
Id. at 109-10.
Id. at 110.
Lunce v. State, 122 N.E.2d 5 (Ind. 1954).
Overlade, 244 F.2d at 110.
Johns v. Smyth, 176 F. Supp. 949, 953 (E.D. Va. 1959).
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representation afforded an accused by an attorney
of his own choice may be so inadequate that his
conviction should be set aside, and has gone further and has discussed in detail the circumstances
that may justify vacation of the judgment.251
By 1960, it appeared that in some significant number of cases criminal
defense behavior was far from Brougham’s “an advocate . . . knows, in the
discharge of that office, but one person in the world, that client and none
other.”252 A sociological study in the mid-1950s of criminal defense lawyers, published in book form in 1967, suggested the breadth of the problem.
The author concluded, “If the comments of our respondents may be accepted, it would seem that there is an element in the legal profession who deviate rather seriously from these [ethical] standards as well as a group whose
attitude of complacence in this matter leaves something to be desired.”253 In
the April 1964 issue of Harper’s Magazine, the author, a professor of law at
the University of Michigan, wrote, “[B]ig-city criminal lawyers are the pariahs of the legal profession. . . . In part because of the indifference and
disdain which the leaders of the bar feel for those who practice criminal
law, the field is rife with unethical or dubious practices.”254
Some lawyers reminded the public that zealous advocacy by defense
counsel was essential to protect the liberties of all Americans.255 In the early
1960s, the use of contempt citations to silence zealous criminal defense
counsel was slightly narrowed.256 In Cooper v. Superior Court,257 the California Supreme Court overturned a contempt citation levied against defense
counsel, who attempted to address the trial court respectfully to inform it
that its actions were error. And several books were published during this
time in support of the liberal value of zealous advocacy. In 1962, the fa251.
W. M. Moldoff, Annotation, Incompetency of Counsel Chosen by Accused as
Affecting Validity of Conviction, 74 A.L.R.2d 1390, 1397 (1960).
252.
HANSARD’S PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, supra note 1, at 114.
253.
ARTHUR LEWIS WOOD, CRIMINAL LAWYER 131 (1967). However, Wood also
concluded, “In truth, it is difficult to impute more unethical conduct to criminal lawyers.” Id.
at 114.
254.
B. J. George, Jr., A New Approach to Criminal Law, HARPER’S, Apr. 1964, at
183.
255.
See, e.g., Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44
A.B.A. J. 1159, 1161 (1958) (concluding “partisan advocacy plays a vital and essential role
in one of the most fundamental procedures of a democratic society” and is “an indispensable
part of a larger ordering of affairs”); E. Wayne Thode, The Ethical Standard for the Advocate, 39 TEX. L. REV. 575, 576 (1961) (rejecting “non-authoritative ethical standards” because it “is an interference with the client-lawyer relationship . . . .”).
256.
Prosecutorial misconduct remained a significant problem for the remainder of
the 1960s. See Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEX. L. REV. 629 (1972).
257.
Cooper v. Superior Court, 359 P.2d 274 (Cal. 1961).
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mous criminal defense lawyer Edward Bennett Williams258 wrote a book on
the important role of the criminal defense lawyer in protecting the liberties
of Americans pursuant to the rule of law.259 The rule of law distinguished
the United States from “the system of which Mr. Khrushchev is so
proud.”260 And a San Francisco criminal defense lawyer named J. W.
“Jake” Ehrlich was the subject of a 1955 biography that sold over two million copies, a book which noted his adversarial zeal.261
Despite those success stories, the criminal defense lawyer was pigeonholed at the low end of the bar,262 and regularly portrayed in the 1960s as
displaying traits antithetical to even modest definitions of professionalism.263 In a 1964 law review article, a criminal law professor examined why
his students were hostile to criminal law work.264 In a scathing review of a
book written by a criminal defense lawyer, the reviewer noted that, if criminal defense work was as written, it “can only deter high-minded lawyers
from entering [the practice of criminal defense].”265 In 1966, the ABA Journal published an article bemoaning the state of the criminal defense bar, for
criminal cases “all too often . . . go by default to small segments of the Bar,
and these coteries develop an extralegal know-how that consists of jockey-

258.
On Williams, see EVAN THOMAS, THE MAN TO SEE: EDWARD BENNETT
WILLIAMS, ULTIMATE INSIDER; LEGENDARY TRIAL LAWYER (paper ed. 1992); Evan Thomas,
Williams, Edward Bennett, in YALE BIOG. DICT. OF AM. L. at 591.
259.
EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMS, ONE MAN’S FREEDOM (1962).
260.
Id. at 7; See also id. at 300 (“We tell the world every day that the concept of
government by consent must prevail over the concept of government by compulsion, that the
concept of government-of-laws must prevail over the concept of government-of-men.”).
261.
JOHN WESLEY NOBLE & BERNARD AVERBUCH, NEVER PLEAD GUILTY: THE
STORY OF JAKE EHRLICH THE BRILLIANT CRIMINAL LAWYER (1955). Ehrlich wrote an autobiography, A LIFE IN MY HANDS (1965), which was criticized by one lawyer for its excessive
zeal. See Harris B. Steinberg, “Are You for Real, Jake Ehrlich?”--A Review, 20 THE RECORD
220 (1965) (reviewing J. W. EHRLICH, A LIFE IN MY HANDS (1965)). Unlike its predecessor,
it did not make the New York Times best seller list. On Ehrlich, see Roger K. Newman, Ehrlich, Jacob W., in YALE BIOG. DICT. OF AM. L. at 183.
262.
See Introduction, The Defense Function, in ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 114 (1974) (noting criminal law “practice has steadily lost popularity in comparison with others . . . . for over a half century”). See also Ralph
Slovenko, Attitudes on Legal Representation of Accused Persons, 2 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 101, 102
(1964) (concluding lawyers found criminal defense practice unremunerative and “environmentally degrading”).
263.
This was not the case in terms of fictional portrayals of criminal defense lawyers. In both television shows such as Perry Mason and in books and movies such as Anatomy of a Murder and To Kill a Mockingbird, the criminal defense lawyer was a heroic figure. See Michael Ariens, The Agony of Modern Legal Ethics, 1970-1985, 5 ST. MARY’S J. ON
LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 140, 150-52 (2014).
264.
Slovenko, supra note 262, at 102.
265.
Steinberg, supra note 261, at 227.
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ing cases before the right judge, copping a plea or making a deal.”266 Some
lawyers hoped Gideon v. Wainwright267 would “bring more and better lawyers into the criminal courts,” and the increase in community clinics would
provide greater legal aid.268 The 1966 Airlie Conference on Legal Manpower Needs of Criminal Law concluded that a “minimum estimate” indicated
the need for 4,000-6,000 more criminal defense lawyers.269 The Conference
also concluded, like others, that “in general the criminal practice is not financially attractive enough and is too little respected in the community.”270
One sociologist concluded in 1967 that the criminal defense lawyer practiced law as a “confidence game.”271 Not only was the criminal defense
lawyer not zealous in representing clients, “the adversary features which are
manifest are for the most part muted and exist even in their attenuated form
largely for external consumption.”272 In a study based on interviews of seventy-one criminal defendants about the criminal justice system, the author
concluded the following about the experience those defendants had with
their lawyers: “For the bulk of the defendants—represented by public defenders—their attorney appeared to be at best a middleman and at worst an
enemy agent.”273 Finally, a 1971 study of ten Texas criminal defense lawyers in private practice suggested that “pressures toward cooperation” with
the prosecution existed to the same extent as was alleged in the case of the
public defender, making zealous representation the exception rather than
the norm.274

266.
Henry H. Foster, Jr., Lawmen, Medicine Men and Good Samaritans, 52 A.B.A.
J. 223, 225 (1966).
267.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
268.
Foster, supra note 266, at 225.
269.
Report of the Conference on Legal Manpower Needs of Criminal Law, 41
F.R.D. 389, 393 (1966) [hereinafter Report of the Conference]; see also Edward W. Kuhn,
The President’s Annual Address: The Rule of Law in a Challenging World, 52 A.B.A. J.
825, 829-30 (1966) (noting deficit of criminal defense lawyers). See also Criminal Justice
Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, Pub. L. 88-455, Aug. 20, 1964 (noting goal is to “promote
the cause of criminal justice by providing for the representation of defendants who are financially unable to obtain an adequate defense in criminal cases in the Courts of the United
States”).
270.
Report of the Conference, supra note 269, at 411.
271.
Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game, 1 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 15, 31 (1967).
272.
Id. at 24.
273.
JONATHAN D. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENDANT’S
PERSPECTIVE 123 (paper ed. 1972).
274.
Jackson B. Battle, Comment, In Search of the Adversary System—The Cooperative Practices of Private Criminal Defense Attorneys, 50 TEX. L. REV. 60, 61 (1971).
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THE 1960s AND IDEOLOGICAL CHANGE

A shift in the ideology of criminal defense practice arose as a consequence of both the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Criminal Procedure
revolution of the 1960s275 and the civil rights and student movements of the
same period.276
The Court’s 1963 Gideon decision, which constitutionally mandated a
lawyer be provided an indigent felony defendant, was but a beginning of
the Court’s re-shaping of the criminal justice system. The Court followed
with decisions concerning the privilege against self-incrimination (Malloy
v. Hogan),277 the right to confront witnesses (Pointer v. Texas),278 a ban on
prosecution comment on the defendant’s decision not to testify (Griffin v.
California),279 the right of an indigent defendant to counsel on appeal
(Douglas v. California),280 Miranda warnings,281 the right to a speedy trial
(Klopfer v. North Carolina),282 the right of a criminal defendant to compulsory process (Washington v. Texas),283 two cases expanding the right of
confrontation (Bruton v. United States284 and Barber v. Page285), and other
cases enlarging the constitutional rights of the criminally accused.286
The civil rights and anti-Vietnam War movements brought those protesting societal ills in regular contact with the criminal justice system. The
result was an increasing concern with the defense of those accused of
crimes. For self-styled radical lawyers, the “detachment” of the lawyer from
the client was denounced “as a hoax and as the graveyard of any hope of
social transformation.”287 A distinction between the “liberal” ACLU lawyer
275.
See POWE, supra note 8, at 379-444; STUNTZ, supra note 8, at 216-43.
276.
See WILLIAM L. O’NEILL, COMING APART: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF AMERICA
IN THE 1960S at 158-94, 279-92 (paper ed. 1978).
277.
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
278.
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
279.
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
280.
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
281.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
282.
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
283.
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
284.
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
285.
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
286.
See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (incorporating exclusionary rule
of Fourth Amendment into Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1965) (requiring hearing on competency to stand trial).
287.
Robert Lefcourt, Introduction, in LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE: ESSAYS TO
DEMYSTIFY LAW, ORDER AND THE COURTS 4 (paper ed. 1971). See also Gerald B. Lefcourt,
The Radical Lawyer Under Attack, in LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE, at 253, 259 (“Movement
lawyers have started a process of challenge and protest that counters the ‘officer of the court’
consciousness and affirms their role as political beings struggling against illegitimate rulers
and fighting for the rights and aspirations of oppressed people.”); Fred Cohn, Soldiers Say
No, in LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE, at 300 (“It is a growing belief among a new generation of
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and the radical lawyer was that the former’s “constitutional principles have
insulated him from a more partisan commitment.”288 The radical lawyer
“need not share the precise politics of his client, but those politics should be
his prime concern, and not the abstract enforcement of the abstract principles that make up the Bill of Rights.”289 This close identification of lawyer
and client was anathema to most lawyers.
In this milieu, Brougham’s ethic of advocacy was urged as a way to
revitalize the lawyer’s traditional duty of client loyalty, particularly when
representing the indigent or otherwise powerless client. This effort had the
effect of both arguing for a rise in professionalism in criminal defense practice, and rejecting the radical view that lawyers should wholly identify with
their clients. The first sharp attack demanding an attention to zealous advocacy in criminal defense practice came in 1966 from a talk (later published
with responses) to criminal defense lawyers in the District of Columbia by
Monroe Freedman, then a professor of law at George Washington University. Freedman asked three questions: was it proper to cross-examine a truthful witness to discredit that witness? Was it proper to put a witness on the
stand who you know will commit perjury? Was it proper to give the accused legal advice when you believe that knowledge will tempt him to
commit perjury?290 Freedman concluded the answer to each was yes.291 His
talk led to a failed attempt to disbar him292 and was a harbinger of a reinvigorated ideal of zealous advocacy.293
When Freedman’s Lawyers’ Ethics in an Adversary System was published in 1975, he was comfortable claiming that the definition of zeal in
lawyers that the distinction between themselves and their clients is often arbitrary and elitist.”). See also Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers and Revolution, 30 U. PITT. L. REV. 125, 130
(1968) (noting “the lawyer qua advocate plays an essentially non-critical role”).
288.
Jonathan Black, Introduction, in RADICAL LAWYERS: THEIR ROLE IN THE
MOVEMENT AND IN THE COURTS 12 (paper ed. 1971).
289.
Id. “It is impossible to be a political radical while playing the games of the
system in court. The confines and biases of the lawyer’s role are a continuing damper on his
activity as a radical, let alone a revolutionary.” Id. at 12.
290.
Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1469 (1966).
291.
He later gave a much more nuanced answer to the third question. See
FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 75.
292.
Id. at viii.
293.
See Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and Defense Personnel: A Symposium, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 8 et seq. (1966) (discussing ethical duties of defense counsel when
defendant claims innocence, when defendant acknowledges guilt but will not plead guilty
and when defendant claims innocence but wishes to plead guilty to lesser charge). None of
the participants justified their conclusions based on Brougham, and one, then-Judge Warren
Burger, rejected the claim that “a lawyer is bound to do whatever his client demands.” See
Warren Burger, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and Defense Personnel: A Judge’s
Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 11, 15 (1966).
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the ABA’s Canons of Ethics and its Code of Professional Responsibility
was captured in the “classic statement of that ideal by Lord Brougham” in
his representation of Caroline.294 Freedman was joined by others. A lawyer
named Paul Teschner also called Brougham’s view the “classic statement.”295 Teschner underscored the need for zealous representation of persons in criminal and other public law matters because “the viability of public law is itself dependent upon a real limitation of state power.”296 That
was why criminal defense lawyers “must never prevaricate in their representation of clients merely because the state is involved.”297 Teschner’s
conclusion reiterated the views of lawyers from the 1950s, though those
lawyers made such statements without using Brougham for support. Those
lawyers, including the well-known criminal defense lawyer Lloyd Paul
Stryker, contextualized rather than embraced Brougham.298 This recent history was apparently forgotten. Harvard Law School Professor Charles Fried
joined the revisionist parade in 1976, accepting without citing any authority
that Brougham’s defense of Caroline formed the “traditional view of the
lawyer’s role.”299 Professor Lee Teitelbaum invoked Brougham to urge
lawyers to understand their role was crucial to ensuring the rights of the
accused, even the confessedly guilty accused, to “put the state to its burden
of proof before conviction and sentence.”300 Like Teschner, Teitelbaum
focused on the importance of a zealous criminal defense lawyer in serving
“a tenet of our political philosophy that any individual is entitled to claim a
substantial distance from a State acting to deprive him of liberty.”301 This,
of course, was central to earlier writings of lawyers, which rejected or contextualized Brougham.
Finally, the ABA on two occasions focused the American lawyer’s attention to the ideal of zealous representation, though it did not mention
Brougham. First, it adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility in
1969,302 Canon 7 of which was titled, A Lawyer Should Represent a Client
294.
FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 9.
295.
Paul A. Teschner, Lawyer Morality, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 789, 834 (1970).
296.
Id. at 835.
297.
Id.
298.
STRYKER, supra note 203, at 277.
299.
Fried, supra note 4, at 1060 n.1. Fried, a Harvard Law School professor, may
have been echoing either Freedman, who wrote a year earlier and whose book was reviewed
in the January 1976 issue of the Harvard Law Review, see Ronald D. Rotunda, Book Review,
89 HARV. L. REV. 622 (1976), or Charles Curtis, a Boston lawyer and a Harvard Law School
graduate.
300.
Lee E. Teitelbaum, The Advocate’s Role in the Legal System, 6 N.M. L. REV. 1,
8 (1975).
301.
Id. at 21.
302.
See Report of the Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethics Standards, 94
A.B.A. REP. 728 (1969) (recommending adoption of Code by ABA House of Delegates);
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Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law. Disciplinary Rule 7-101, titled
Representing a Client Zealously, made it a disciplinary offense for a lawyer
intentionally to “fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means.”303 Second, the ABA adopted in 1971 its Standards on the Prosecution Function and the Defense Function.304 This project
began in 1964, the same year the ABA began its work on the Code of Professional Responsibility.305 The ABA’s standards on the Defense Function
stressed the “primary role of [defense] counsel is to act as champion for his
client,” and noted that “[c]ourage and zeal in the defense of his client’s interest are qualities without which one cannot fully perform as an advocate.”306
C.

WATERGATE AND HARD TIMES

These efforts to reinforce the importance of zealous representation by
criminal defense counsel were affected by other events taking place at the
same time. The Watergate burglars were tried in early 1973, and for the
next eighteen months the public witnessed a lurid display of lawyers attempting to defend their often venal and self-interested actions.307 The public’s abhorrence of lawyers appeared in part a result of lawyers acting as
Brougham-like agents of their clients and not as “officers of the court.” The
stature of American lawyers among the public tumbled during and in the
aftermath of Watergate. A 1973 Harris Poll found that just 24 percent of the
public had confidence in lawyers.308 A 1976 Gallup Poll found that just 25
percent of the public believed lawyers rated very high or high in their “hon-

Proceedings of the 1969 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 94 A.B.A. REP. 378,
389-92 (1969) (approving adoption of Code). On the creation of the Code, see Ariens, supra
note 107, at 433-44.
303.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Disc. R. 7-101 (A)(1).
304.
See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION
FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 71 (1974).
305.
Id. at iv.
306.
Id. at 109-10.
307.
See David R. Brink, Who Will Regulate the Bar?, 61 A.B.A. J. 936, 937 (1975)
(“[I]f Watergate has not tarnished the image of lawyers, at least it has acutely intensified
public consciousness of questions of legal ethics and professional accountability.”). See
generally Ariens, supra note 262, at 182-84 (discussing impact of Watergate scandal on
lawyer ethics).
308.
See Michael Asimow, Lawyers, Popular Perception of, in OXFORD COMPANION
TO AMERICAN LAW 495 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 2002). See also Hearings on The Organized
Bar, at 6, 7 (noting that this still beat Congress, which received an 18 percent confidence
mark).
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esty and ethical standards.”309 Writing in 1975, one ABA President admitted, “Early in its development Watergate was characterized as a lawyer’s
scandal.”310
In 1976, the National Organization of Bar Counsel released a list of
twenty-nine lawyers involved in Watergate-related bar disciplinary matters.311 From that list, seven were disbarred, and eleven others, including
two lawyers neither indicted nor named as unindicted co-conspirators, were
publicly disciplined.312
At the same time, the American legal profession felt the tremors of an
economic downturn. In 1972, Business Week claimed “the outlook for lawyers is grim,” and predicted an oversupply of 200,000 lawyers by 1985.313
That same year, the ABA created a Task Force on Professional Utilization
because it was concerned about “the increase in the number of” lawyers.314
Later in the decade, the Supreme Court held minimum fee schedules unconstitutional,315 and struck down Arizona’s ban on lawyer advertising.316 Additionally, the Federal Trade Commission opened an investigation of the
American legal profession in December 1977.317 Richard Sander and E.
Douglass Williams provide the best evidence of the economic straits in the
legal profession of the 1970s: in 1983 dollars, the median income of lawyers in 1969 was $47,638. In 1979, lawyer median income had declined to
$36,716,318 a twenty-three percent drop in real income in ten years. Instead
309.
GALLUP,
Honesty/Ethics
in
Professions,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1654/honesty-ethics-professions.aspx#3 (last visited Nov. 6,
2014). This compared much less favorably than public polls regarding the standing of lawyers taken during the first half of the 1960s. See Ariens, supra note 262, at 147-53.
310.
James D. Fellers, President’s Page, 61 A.B.A. J. 529 (1975).
311.
See N.O.B.C. Reports on Results of Watergate-Related Charges against Twentynine Lawyers, 62 A.B.A. J. 1337 (1976) [hereinafter N.O.B.C. Reports]. For a more caustic
view of a critic, see Jerold S. Auerbach, The Legal Profession After Watergate, 22 WAYNE
L. REV. 1287, 1287 (1976) (“The law-enforcers, lawyers all, were the law-breakers.”).
312.
N.O.B.C. Reports, supra note 311, at 1337. See also Kathleen Clark, The Legacy
of Watergate for Legal Ethics Instruction, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 673, 678-79 (1999) (noting
discipline of sixteen lawyers and not including the two lawyers not indicted or listed as
unindicted co-conspirators).
313.
Special Report, The Job Gap for College Graduates in the ’70s, BUS. WK., Sept.
23, 1972, at 48, 51.
314.
See Report of the Task Force on Professional Utilization, 97 A.B.A. Rep. 818,
819 (1972) (quoting charge of ABA Board of Governors to Task Force). The number of
lawyers increased from 355,242 in 1970 to 542,205 in 1980. See THE LAWYER STATISTICAL
REPORT: A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1980S at 4 (Barbara
A. Curran et al. eds., 1985).
315.
Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
316.
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
317.
See F.T.C. Goes Public on Lawyer Probe, 64 A.B.A. J. 959 (1978).
318.
Richard H. Sander & E. Douglass Williams, Why Are There So Many Lawyers?
Perspectives on a Turbulent Market, 14 LAW & SOC. INQ. 431, 448 (1989).
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of earning 1.85 times the income of the median American worker, the median income lawyer now earned 1.35 times, a significant loss of earning
power in just one decade.319
D.

THE FATAL TURN, 1977-1983

These crises, one ideological and the other material, required decision
makers within the American legal profession to make a choice: would lawyers defend the role morality of the neutral advocate acting for the benefit
of the client, or adopt a role that embraced a larger view of the lawyer as a
servant of the public, as an officer of the court? The profession chose the
former option, though not without debate.
In August 1977, the ABA created a special committee, later known as
the Kutak Commission, to investigate “all facets of legal ethics.”320 This
was apparently because the 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility suffered “from a defect common to the adolescent stage of growth. . . . It is
rigid and simplistic, complex and contradictory, and difficult to read.”321
When a private, “working draft” of the proposed Model Rules was leaked
in August 1979,322 and when the initial Discussion Draft was officially published in January 1980, the Kutak Commission went out of its way to avoid
using “zeal” or “zealous.”323 Indeed, in its private meetings that led to these
drafts, the Kutak Commission concluded: “‘Zealous,’ it seems, has curiously come to mean ‘overzealous.’ Strong sentiment was found around the
table for dropping ‘zeal’ altogether as a descriptive term with ethical consequences. It carries with it simply too much baggage.”324 In addition to
319.
Id. at 449. See also RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 67 (1995) (noting
“the price of legal services fell (in real, that is, inflation-adjusted, terms), rather than, as
popular and professional opinion alike supposes, rose, between 1970 and 1985”).
320.
See William B. Spann, Jr., The Legal Profession Needs a New Code of Ethics,
B. LEADER, Nov.-Dec. 1977, at 2, 3. See generally Board of Governors Proceedings, 102
A.B.A. REP. 581 (1977) (approving creation of committee).
321.
L. Ray Patterson, Wanted: A New Code of Professional Responsibility, 63
A.B.A. J. 639 (1977).
322.
See Mark H. Aultman, Legal Fiction Becomes Legal Fantasy, 7 J. LEGAL PROF.
31, 39 (1982) (noting “working draft” was “to be reviewed by a select few” but was published by the Bureau of National Affairs’ Daily Report for Executives on August 13, 1979);
See The Record: Text of Initial Draft of Ethics Code Rewrite Committee, LEGAL TIMES, Aug.
27, 1979, at 26 (publishing working draft).
323.
Neither the working draft nor the Discussion Draft uses either word.
324.
See COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS JOURNALS, Feb.
23-24, 1979 (Research Triangle Park, North Carolina) 19-20 (copy on file with author). The
JOURNALS are a compilation of the twelve meetings of the Kutak Commission that took place
before it released its Discussion Draft on January 30, 1980. The only publicly available
compilation of the JOURNALS I am aware of is located at Yale Law School. It was likely
given to the Library by Kutak Commission Reporter Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., then a Yale
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avoiding the words “zeal” and “zealous,” proposed rules on client confidences (Rule 1.7)325 and a duty of candor toward the tribunal (Rule 3.1)326
in the Discussion Draft made the lawyer as much an “officer of the court”
as the mouthpiece of the client.
A significant number of lawyers reacted badly to the Discussion Draft
of the Kutak Commission, to both the general limitations on zeal as essential to client loyalty and in particular to the idea that the Model Rules might
mandate the disclosure of some client confidences.327 When the Proposed
Final Draft was issued in May 1981, no mandatory disclosure exception to
the rule on client confidences (renumbered as Rule 1.6) remained.328 Further, it now used the word “zeal,” though it cautioned that zeal was “better
conceived as one of commitment to achievement of the client’s lawful objectives.”329 The ABA finally approved Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in February 1983, but the exceptions to the rule of confidentiality were even narrower.330 When the Model Rules were adopted in
August, they emphasized the lawyer’s duties to a client and soft-pedaled
other duties. Zeal was now embraced: “A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”331
The zealous advocate, justified in the criminal law for reasons invoking the rule of law and the need to find a champion to aid those whose life
or liberty was at stake against a powerful state, was re-cast. The Model
Rules indicated all advocates were required to act zealously. The legal profession defended its social role through an ever-tightening focus on zealLaw School professor. An email from me to Prof. Hazard’s University of Pennsylvania
email address asking if this was the case was unanswered.
325.
ABA COMM. ON EVALUATION OF PROF’L STANDARDS, DISCUSSION DRAFT,
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 21-26 (January 30, 1980) (stating general rule, Rule 1.7,
that client confidences are to remain undisclosed, but listing two exceptions to general rule,
including one mandating disclosure) [hereinafter DISCUSSION DRAFT]. See generally Michael
Ariens, “Playing Chicken”: An Instant History of the Battle Over Exceptions to Client Confidences, 33 J. LEGAL PROF. 239, 257-58 (2009) (discussing history of approach taken in
Discussion Draft regarding exceptions to client confidences, and noting disgruntlement in
profession with proposal).
326.
DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 325, at 59-68 (noting in comments duty of criminal defense counsel to disclose perjury of defendant).
327.
See generally COMPILATION OF COMMENTS ON THE MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (4 vols. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., comp. 1980) (reprinting comments
on Discussion Draft) (copy on file with author). See also Ariens, supra note 325 (discussing
history of client confidentiality rule and its exceptions).
328.
ABA COMM. ON EVALUATION OF PROF’L STANDARDS, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT,
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (May 30, 1981).
329.
Id. at 25.
330.
See Proceedings of the 1983 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 108
A.B.A. REP. 289, 296-98 (1983).
331.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. (1983).
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ousness.332 The justification of zealous advocacy aligned the ideological
and material interests of private practice lawyers. It was both economically
beneficial to concern oneself with the interests of one’s client and the epitome of professional behavior. Best of all, one could refer to Brougham for
support.
In 1980, Dean L. Ray Patterson, the initial Reporter for (and later Consultant to) the Kutak Commission, declared, “The prevailing notion among
lawyers seems to be that the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to the client is the
first, the foremost, and, on occasion, the only duty of the lawyer.”333 Writing in the aftermath of the response to the Discussion Draft, Patterson foresaw Brougham’s ethic of advocacy was now a “classic statement” of the
duty of loyalty of lawyer to client. It was classic because it fit the material
and ideological interests of much of the profession.

V. CONCLUSION
Brougham’s ethic of advocacy continues to represent a challenge to
the American legal profession’s understanding of its role and purpose in
American society. Those who wrote in the 1970s defending the criminal
defense lawyer’s zealous advocacy wrote in the hope and expectation that
the profession would live up to its highest ideals, particularly in the aftermath of the Watergate mess. The state’s power to take the life or liberty of a
person necessitated a criminal defense bar that took seriously its role in
effectuating the rule of law. That some criminal defense lawyers at all times
served their clients (and thus, society) zealously was clear. But the fear that
the respectable bar had ignored the practice of criminal law as well as the
institutions of criminal justice provided some cause to use Brougham’s ethic of advocacy to encourage the effort to grasp the profession’s aspirational
ideals.
The efforts to adapt Brougham’s ethic to justify the conduct of lawyers
beyond the criminal defense bar has been challenged from within and from

332.
An early critical view regarding excessive zeal was Marvin Frankel, The Search
for the Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975). Frankel served as a member of the Kutak Commission. For a critical view of a reliance on zeal as applied to counselors representing clients, see Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of
Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669 (1978).
333.
L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer’s Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY L.J.
909, 918 (1980). One ABA Section criticized the Discussion Draft in a long letter to the
Reporter declaring, “Taken as a whole, the Model Rules, and most particularly the provisions covering Confidential Communications . . . reflect a retreat from the traditional view of
a lawyer’s role as confidant and zealous representative of the client.” See 3 COMPILATION OF
COMMENTS § O-40 at 27 (reprinting comment of ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid
and Indigent Defendants).
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outside the profession.334 American lawyers possess a fearsome public
reputation, which may be why the public finds lawyer jokes so appealing.335
The profession is also replete with thoughtful, concerned persons who understand the tension found in either the acceptance or rejection of Brougham’s ethic of advocacy. Lawyers have always attempted to serve both their
clients and themselves, and also have been required to serve the legal system as officers of the court. Despite the best efforts to cabin one or more of
these duties, this professional and personal tension is ineradicable. The
lawyer is always juggling several balls, in the impossible hope that they
will remain in the air.

334.
See THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS (David Luban
ed., 1983); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 166 (1988) (“[T]he
role of legal hired gun is morally untenable.”); William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29.
335.
See generally MARC GALANTER, LOWERING THE BAR: LAWYER JOKES & LEGAL
CULTURE (2005).

